Leveling the Deference Playing Field by Kovacs, Kathryn E.
KOVACS 1/31/2012 1:40 PM 
 
[583] 
KATHRYN E. KOVACS* 
Leveling the Deference Playing Field 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 583 
I.  The APA’s Single Standard of Review ................................. 587 
II.  The Courts’ Many Standards of Review ............................... 591 
 A. Case Law ........................................................................ 592 
 B. Empirical Evidence ........................................................ 596 
III.  The Problem of Giving the Military Super-Deference 
Under the APA ...................................................................... 599 
 A. Common-Law Overlay ................................................... 600 
 B. Democratic Accountability ............................................ 605 
 C. The Values of the APA .................................................. 608 
 D. Doctrinal Confusion and Judicial Hypocrisy ................. 610 
 E. The Supreme Court’s Narrowing of APA Common 
Law ................................................................................. 613 
IV.  Potential Justifications for Super-Deference to the 
Military .................................................................................. 615 
 A. Constitutional Status ...................................................... 616 
 B. Expertise ......................................................................... 623 
 C. Procedural Distinctions .................................................. 629 
 D. Ideology.......................................................................... 631 
V.  Implications ........................................................................... 634 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 639 
 
INTRODUCTION 
ourts give federal agencies substantial deference in cases 
challenging agency action.  That deference appropriately credits 
agency expertise.1  The military, however, tends to get more 
deference than other agencies, and not only in cases that directly 
 
* Assistant Professor, Rutgers School of Law–Camden.  Thanks to Emily Maezell, John 
Oberdiek, Beto Juarez, and Robert Knowles for reading drafts of this Article. 
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implicate military expertise, but also in administrative law cases 
raising constitutional, environmental, and employment issues, among 
others.2  Given that the Department of Defense is the largest agency 
in the federal government, the judicial practice of giving the military 
excessive deference in administrative law cases has a profound effect 
on the courts’ ability to fulfill their critical function of ensuring that 
agencies comply with federal law.  I argue here that the judicial 
practice of giving the military more deference than other agencies in 
administrative law cases should end.  All agencies are entitled to the 
courts’ respect, but there is no ground for insulating the military from 
searching judicial review any more than other agencies. 
This Article falls at the intersection of two debates that have 
engaged academics, courts, and practitioners alike.  First is the long-
running and lively debate about the extent to which courts should 
defer to the military when reviewing military action.3  Second is the 
equally long-running and lively debate about the role of common law 
in administrative law.4  More than sixty years after Congress codified 
the basic tenets of administrative law in the Administrative Procedure 
Act of 1946 (APA),5 the courts continue to rely on judicially created 
 
1 See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004) (“We 
‘normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation of longstanding 
duration,’ recognizing that ‘well-reasoned views’ of an expert administrator rest on ‘a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly 
resort for guidance.’”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 
1363 (2009) (concluding that “many arguments in favor of deference are unpersuasive, but 
. . . deference nonetheless may be justified in limited circumstances”); Jonathan Masur, A 
Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 
441, 445 n.16 (2005) (listing articles).  Compare, e.g., Christina E. Wells, Questioning 
Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903 (2004), with Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: 
A Response to Professors Epstein and Wells, 69 MO. L. REV. 959 (2004).  A notable new 
addition to this debate is A More Perfect Military: How the Constitution Can Make Our 
Military Stronger, in which Diane H. Mazur argues that excessive judicial deference to the 
military contributed to the erosion of civil–military relations.  DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE 
PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER 
190–91 (2010). 
4 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2767 n.5 (2010) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“There is an ongoing debate about the role of equitable adjustments in 
administrative law.”). 
5 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500). 
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doctrines of administrative common law, supplying ample fodder for 
scholarly discussion.6 
This Article examines the courts’ application of an extraordinary 
level of deference to the military in APA cases, even though Congress 
made a deliberate decision to subject the military to the same standard 
of review as other federal agencies under the APA.  For all federal 
agency actions that are reviewable under the APA, Congress 
established a single standard of review: “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”7  The 
APA’s history shows that the decision to subject all agencies to the 
same level of judicial inquiry was deliberate.  Yet, courts continue to 
apply different standards of review to different agencies.  The military 
continues to enjoy “super-deference,”8 even for actions that are 
reviewed under the APA.  This Article explains why that is a problem 
and why there is no satisfactory explanation for that distinction. 
In the APA, Congress carved out exceptions for some actions, 
including exceptions that gave the military special treatment.  The 
APA does not apply to actions taken pursuant to “military authority 
exercised in the field in time of war.”9  In my article, A History of the 
Military Authority Exception in the Administrative Procedure Act, I 
demonstrated that the scope of the “military authority” exception was 
intended to be broad and argued that it should continue to be 
interpreted broadly because it is a condition on a waiver of federal 
sovereign immunity.10  In light of that, I argue here that the “military 
authority” exception insulates core military functions from judicial 
review under the APA, and thus there is no basis for the courts’ 
tendency to give the military greater deference than other agencies.  
The exception already accommodates separation-of-powers concerns 
raised by judicial interference with the President’s authority as 
 
6 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 113 (1998); Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable 
Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010); 
Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345. 
7 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
8 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098 (2008). 
9 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(G).  For a historiographic analysis of that provision, see Kathryn 
E. Kovacs, A History of the Military Authority Exception in the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 62 ADMIN. L . REV. 673 (2010). 
10 Kovacs, supra note 9, at 676 n.21, 720. 
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Commander in Chief, and it removes concern about courts second-
guessing military expertise in particular by making actions that 
directly implicate that expertise unreviewable. 
Because, under the APA, courts may not review core military 
functions, this Article concludes that, in APA cases, the military 
should receive the same level of deference as other agencies under the 
arbitrary or capricious standard.  My goal here is not to take on the 
entire concept of administrative common law or to argue that the 
military’s administrative actions are never entitled to increased 
deference.  Rather, I seek only to prove the narrow point that, under 
the APA, all agencies should receive deferential review and the 
military should receive no more or less deference than any other 
agency. 
Part I of this Article describes the APA’s single standard of review 
and briefly recounts the history of the Act, highlighting the 
deliberateness of Congress’s choice to subject the military to the same 
standard of review as other agencies.  This discussion provides some 
perspective as to why the practice of giving the military super-
deference causes particular concerns, beyond textualist and originalist 
arguments.  Part II examines the evidence that, despite the plain 
language of the APA, the courts frequently apply different standards 
of review to different agencies, specifically a super-deference 
standard to the military.  Part III then discusses the problematic 
aspects of that practice.  Unauthorized federal common law generally 
raises separation-of-powers concerns.  The extraordinary nature of the 
APA and administrative common law raise additional concerns.  And 
the practice of giving the military super-deference undermines the 
goals of the APA and contradicts the Supreme Court’s increasing 
tendency to respect the text of the APA. 
Part IV turns to the question of whether there is an adequate 
justification for giving the military super-deference instead of 
reviewing military cases under the arbitrary or capricious standard.11  
I contest the arguments that judicial review under the APA would 
interfere with the President’s authority as Commander in Chief and 
that the military’s expertise and information entitle it to a more 
deferential standard of review than other agencies.  I discuss briefly 
the impact of ideology on the courts’ deference practice and the 
procedural distinctions that may merit increased deference and that 
 
11 I leave open the possibility that there may be an adequate justification for giving 
other agencies heightened deference under the APA. 
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would benefit from further study.  Part V closes with a discussion of 
how judicial candor might counteract the courts’ tendency to give the 
military more deference than other agencies under the APA. 
I 
THE APA’S SINGLE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Some federal statutes provide the cause of action and waiver of 
sovereign immunity necessary to sue the federal government.12  Other 
statutes are actionable only through the APA,13 which provides a 
cause of action for “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of 
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action 
within the meaning of a relevant statute” and waives the 
government’s immunity from suits “seeking relief other than money 
damages.”14  Section 10(e) of the APA provides a uniform standard 
of review for all agency action that is subject to judicial review under 
the Act.  What is now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) authorizes 
courts to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”15  The 
debate over the meaning of that phrase continues.16  For purposes of 
this discussion, it suffices to say that Congress intended for that 
standard to be quite deferential.17  The Supreme Court has held that, 
 
12 E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7418, 7604 (2006). 
13 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 3:3.1 (2d ed. 
2011); e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f. 
14 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
15 Section 706(2) of the APA sets forth several other standards of review as well, 
including the “substantial evidence” standard for factual determinations.  5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(E).  For purposes of this Article, I use the arbitrary or capricious standard as a 
shorthand for the various standards set forth in section 706(2), as do many courts and 
commentators.  See, e.g., Indep. Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1248 n.1 
(9th Cir. 2000); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy 
Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 232 n.70, 233 
(1996); see also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Paragraph (A) of subsection 
706(2)—the ‘arbitrary or capricious’ provision—is a catchall, picking up administrative 
misconduct not covered by the other more specific paragraphs.”). 
16 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or “The Deciders”—The Courts in 
Administrative Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 820–21 (2008); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing 
a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009); Adrian 
Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1118 (2009) 
(arguing that the arbitrary or capricious standard is an “adjustable parameter[],” the 
intensity of which may be adjusted “as wars, security threats, and emergencies come and 
go”); id. at 1134. 
17  S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 87 (1941) (“To state the matter very broadly judicial review is 
generally limited to the inquiry whether the administrative agency acted within the scope 
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under what is now generally referred to as the “arbitrary or capricious 
standard,” courts “must consider whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of relevant factors and whether there has been a clear 
error of judgment.”18  This narrow standard requires only a “rational” 
foundation for the agency action.19 
In addition to the regular deference given under the APA, the 
military also enjoys an exemption from the APA’s judicial review 
provisions for “military authority exercised in the field in time of 
war.”20  That exemption encompasses a somewhat broader range of 
military action than a modern reader might suppose from the plain 
language.  It may apply, for example, to action taken within the 
United States, far removed from the locus of combat, and without a 
congressional declaration of war.21  But much military action falls 
outside the scope of the “military authority” exemption and thus is 
subject to judicial review under the same arbitrary or capricious 
standard as other federal agency actions.22 
The history of the APA demonstrates that the practice of giving the 
military greater deference than other agencies is not just another case 
of the courts playing fast and loose with statutory text.  Congress 
spent seventeen years constructing the APA.  Professor George 
Shepherd has provided an award-winning history of that legislative 
process,23 and I have examined the history of the “military authority” 
 
of its authority.  The wisdom, reasonableness, or expediency of the action in the 
circumstances are said to be matters of administrative judgment to be determined 
exclusively by the agency.”); see also Heath A. Brooks, American Trucking Associations 
v. EPA: The D.C. Circuit’s Missed Opportunity to Unambiguously Discard the Hard Look 
Doctrine, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 259, 270 (2003); Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing 
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 430 (2009); John F. 
Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of 
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 663 n.246 (1996); Metzger, supra note 6, at 491. 
18 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
19 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 
(1983); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009); In re 
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
20 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(G) (2006).  The same exception applies to the rest of the Act 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(G).  The military enjoys exemptions from the rulemaking 
and adjudication provisions as well.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1), 554(a)(4). 
21 See Kovacs, supra note 9, at 712–14, 719. 
22 John B. McDaniel, The Availability and Scope of Judicial Review of Discretionary 
Military Administrative Decisions, 108 MIL. L. REV. 89, 94 (1985) (“By specifically 
excluding only certain military functions, Congress must have intended by negative 
implication that, in the exercise of other functions, the military should be included within 
the term ‘agency’ and therefore subject to the judicial review provisions of the APA.”). 
23 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act 
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996). 
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exception in depth elsewhere.24  Here, I provide a brief summary of 
the process that led Congress to subject all final agency action, 
including military action, to the same standard of judicial review. 
The drive for administrative reform began early in the twentieth 
century with the growth of administrative agencies and faith in the 
power of expertise to cure the ills of a rapidly industrializing 
society.25  The first administrative reform bill was submitted in 1929, 
but it was not until Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933 and kicked 
off the New Deal that the American Bar Association formed a Special 
Committee on Administrative Law, which would play a key role in 
the development of the APA.26  And it was not until the Supreme 
Court began to uphold New Deal programs in 1937 that things really 
took off.27 
That year, the ABA Committee submitted a bill proposing to 
subject agency action to judicial review, but its proposal contained 
numerous agency-specific exemptions for agencies such as the 
Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, and for internal revenue, customs, 
and patent matters.28  Senator Mills Logan and Congressman Francis 
Walter introduced the ABA’s proposed bill in 1939, and it “came to 
be known as the Walter-Logan bill.”29  In Congress, the list of 
exempted agencies grew to include the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and trademark and copyright matters, among others.30  
The original bill exempted “the conduct of military or naval 
operations in time of war or civil insurrection.”31  In the final bill, 
which passed Congress in 1940 as Hitler occupied Paris and bombed 
London, the military exemption had broadened to encompass “any 
matter concerning or relating to the conduct of the military or naval 
establishments.”32 
President Roosevelt vetoed the Walter-Logan bill.33  He expressed 
concern that the military exemption was not broad enough because it 
 
24 Kovacs, supra note 9. 
25 Id. at 681. 
26 Id. at 681–82. 
27 Id. at 683–84. 
28 SPECIAL COMM. ON ADMIN. LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL COMM. ON ADMIN. LAW 850 (1937). 
29 Kovacs, supra note 9, at 685. 
30 S. REP. NO. 76-442, § 7(b) (1939); see also Shepherd, supra note 23, at 1618. 
31 SPECIAL COMM. ON ADMIN LAW, supra note 28. 
32 H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. § 7(b) (3d Sess. 1940); Kovacs, supra note 9, at 689. 
33 86 CONG. REC. 13,942–43 (1940). 
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did not insulate non-military agencies engaged in defense-related 
functions.34  He also felt the bill would spur excessive litigation, and 
he was awaiting the report of the Attorney General’s Committee on 
Administrative Procedure, which the Committee submitted about a 
month after the House failed to override the President’s veto.35 
Things changed during the war.  Congressional Democrats grew 
politically weaker, Roosevelt began to back away from the New Deal, 
and the federal judiciary shifted to the left.36  The size of the federal 
bureaucracy exploded—twenty-six new agencies were formed related 
to the war effort—and rationing, inflation, and chronic shortages were 
blamed on agencies.37  The cult of expertise lost its allure, and in its 
place arose a concern about administrative power paving the road to 
totalitarianism.38 
Two weeks after D-Day in 1944, Congress returned to the task of 
administrative reform.39  In the bill that eventually became the APA, 
derived from the Attorney General’s Committee report, Congress 
abandoned the exemptions for individual agencies.  The Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s report emphasized that the bill exempted 
“functional classifications,” rather than “administrative agencies by 
name,”40 and did not “distinguish between ‘good’ agencies and 
others.”41  The House Report highlighted this point. 
The bill is meant to be operative “across the board” in accordance 
with its terms, or not at all.  Where one agency has been able to 
demonstrate that it should be exempted, all like agencies have been 
exempted in general terms.  (See sec. 2(a)).  Where one agency has 
shown that some particular operation should be exempted from any 
 
34 Id. at 13,943. 
35 Kovacs, supra note 9, at 690–91. 
36 Id. at 694. 
37 Id. at 695. 
38 Id. at 695–96. 
39 Id. at 696. 
40 S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. Rep. No. 79-
752 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
(1946), at 191 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; see also id. at 302; TOM C. CLARK, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 26 (1947) (“The exemption for military and naval functions [in the 
rulemaking provisions] is not limited to activities of the War and Navy Departments but 
covers all military and naval functions exercised by any agency.”); id. at 45 (making a 
similar statement regarding adjudication provisions). 
41 S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. Rep. No. 79-
752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40, at 191. 
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particular requirement, the same function in all agencies has been 
exempted.  No agency has been favored by special treatment.42 
Although the APA’s legislative history is somewhat opaque, one of 
the few things that is clear is that uniformity was among Congress’s 
primary goals.  In particular, it is clear that Congress intended to 
subject all agencies to the same standards of review. 
Of course, the military did receive special treatment in the bill.  
The original bill contained broad military exemptions from the public 
information and rulemaking provisions, but no military exemption 
whatsoever from the judicial review provisions.43  The War 
Department urged Congress to exempt the War Department, the 
Army, and the Navy from the bill altogether.44  Congress declined 
that suggestion, however, and instead carved out a narrow exemption 
from the judicial review provisions for “military or naval authority 
exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory.”45 
The final bill passed both houses of Congress on voice votes, and 
President Truman promptly signed the bill into law.46 
II 
THE COURTS’ MANY STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The history encapsulated above shows that the APA represents a 
seventeen-year effort to codify basic principles of administrative law.  
The Supreme Court has emphasized the unusual effort that went into 
constructing this statute and the monumental compromise it 
entailed.47  Yet, the courts often disregard the statute and apply 
common-law doctrines instead.  For example, the history shows that 
Congress treated all agencies alike for purposes of judicial review and 
that uniformity was a central feature of the Act, but the courts 
currently apply different levels of deference to various agencies.  The 
military often receives a higher level of deference than other agencies. 
 
42 H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, H.R. Rep. No. 
79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40, at 250 (emphasis 
added). 
43 Kovacs, supra note 9, at 696–97. 
44 Id. at 697. 
45 Id. at 700–01. 
46 Id. at 703–04. 
47 Id. at 705; see also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40–41 (1950). 
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A.  Case Law 
A few comparisons exemplify this phenomenon.  In cases in which 
agencies have failed to consider evidence, the courts have given more 
deference to the military than other agencies.  In Cone v. Caldera, an 
army officer filed suit to correct his military record.48  The court of 
appeals applied an “unusually deferential” standard of review to the 
military even though it had failed to consider evidence submitted by a 
rating officer.49  In Butte County v. Hogen, in contrast, the court of 
appeals considered a Department of the Interior decision about Indian 
gaming.50  As in Cone v. Caldera, the agency failed to consider 
certain evidence, but the court refused to defer.51 
The courts have also given more deference to the military’s 
analysis of facts than that of other agencies.  Cone v. Caldera was 
essentially a statistical dispute; the court of appeals held that the 
district court should not have engaged in its own statistical analysis.52  
But in Cherokee Nation v. Norton, the court of appeals engaged in its 
own historic analysis, refusing to defer to the Department of the 
Interior’s decision to extend federal acknowledgement to the 
Delaware Tribe of Indians.53 
The courts have gone so far as to invoke doctrines unrelated to the 
APA to bypass meaningful review of the military under the APA.  In 
Custer County Action Ass’n v. Garvey, for example, the Tenth Circuit 
invoked the political question doctrine to avoid second-guessing a 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) determination about military 
airspace.54  By contrast, in United States Air Tour Ass’n v. FAA, the 
same agency’s determination about noise impacts at the Grand 
Canyon received no deference.55  Those cases were decided under the 
same arbitrary or capricious standard, but the courts were more 
deferential when the agency’s analysis related to the military.56 
 
48 223 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
49 Id. at 793–95. 
50 613 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
51 Id. at 194–95. 
52 223 F.3d at 792, 793, 795. 
53 389 F.3d 1074, 1079–81 (10th Cir. 2004). 
54 256 F.3d 1024, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001). 
55 298 F.3d 997, 1018–19 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
56 The APA cases in which courts give the military super-deference appear to fall into 
three categories: cases in which the courts expressly apply a heightened deference 
standard, cases in which the court applies sub silentio a heightened standard of deference 
while giving lip service to the arbitrary or capricious standard, and cases in which the 
courts use other doctrines to bypass the APA.  There may also be APA cases against the 
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Recently, the Supreme Court expressly applied a heightened 
deference standard to the military in an APA case.57  In Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., environmental groups 
obtained a preliminary injunction limiting the Navy’s use of mid-
frequency active sonar in training exercises.58  The injunction was 
premised on the Navy’s alleged violation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),59 which requires federal agencies 
to examine the potential environmental impacts of their proposals 
before implementing them.60  NEPA is actionable only through the 
APA,61 yet the Supreme Court did not mention the arbitrary or 
capricious standard or the “military authority” exception.62  Instead, 
the Court applied a super-deference standard.63 
The Court held that the preliminary injunction constituted an abuse 
of discretion, regardless of whether the lower courts were correct on 
the merits,64 because the lower courts “significantly understated the 
burden the preliminary injunction would impose on the Navy’s ability 
to conduct realistic training exercises, and the injunction’s consequent 
adverse impact on the public interest in national defense.”65  The 
 
military in which the courts pronounce a super-deference standard but actually apply 
normal arbitrary or capricious review.  Those cases do not concern me here.  Rather, my 
concern is with cases in which the courts give the military more deference than they would 
give to other agencies. 
57 For an in-depth history of the federal courts’ hesitation to review military 
administrative actions, see Darrell L. Peck, The Justices and the Generals: The Supreme 
Court and Judicial Review of Military Activities, 70 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
58 129 S. Ct. 365, 373 (2008). 
59 Id. at 372–74 & n.4. 
60 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
61 MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 13. 
62 See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377–78. 
63 Id. at 378. 
64 Id. at 376, 381. 
65 Id. at 377; see also Water Keeper Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 271 F.3d 21 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of an injunction against Navy training that was alleged to have 
violated the Endangered Species Act).  In National Audubon Society v. Department of the 
Navy, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the Navy violated NEPA 
in its analysis of the impacts of constructing a landing field for the Super Hornet aircraft 
but vacated the district court’s injunction as overly broad.  422 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir. 
2005).  The court observed that its judgment rested 
upon two important separation of powers principles.  First, Executive 
decisionmaking must fully comply with the environmental policy mandate that 
Congress has expressed through NEPA . . . .  Second, the judiciary must take 
care not to usurp decisionmaking authority that properly belongs to the Executive 
or unduly hamper the Executive's ability to act within its constitutionally 
assigned sphere of control.  The Navy’s failure to take a hard look at the 
environmental effects of its proposed OLF violated the first of these principles.  
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Court held that the “lower courts failed properly to defer to senior 
Navy officers’ specific, predictive judgments about how the 
preliminary injunction would reduce the effectiveness of the Navy’s   
. . . training exercises.”66  Unlike the lower courts, which found the 
Navy’s allegations of harm “speculative,”67 the Supreme Court was 
willing to accept the assertions of Navy officers in affidavits 
unquestioningly.68  For the Supreme Court, it was sufficient for the 
Navy to have “credibly alleged” that the preliminary injunction would 
“pose a serious threat to national security.”69 
Granted, the question before the Supreme Court in Winter 
concerned the propriety of injunctive relief, a matter the APA leaves 
to the courts’ discretion.70  But the Supreme Court should have 
reviewed the Navy’s action as it would any other agency’s action and 
not given the Navy super-deference.  Compare, for example, the 
Court’s more recent decision in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed 
Farms, in which the Court also overturned a lower court’s entry of 
injunctive relief for a NEPA violation, but grounded its decision on 
the law of equity rather than on a super-deference standard of 
review.71  That traditional mode of analysis would have been 
appropriate in Winter. 
Not only did the Court in Winter fail to acknowledge the 
applicability of the APA’s standard of review, but it also relied on 
earlier statements in non-APA cases about the judicial role in 
reviewing military decisions.  In Goldman v. Weinberger, a Jewish 
Air Force officer alleged that prohibiting him from wearing a 
yarmulke on duty violated his First Amendment rights.72  The 
 
The second-guessing of the Navy in matters of military readiness and the overly 
broad grant of injunctive relief violated the second. 
Id. at 207. 
66 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 378. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 377. 
69 Id. at 381.  Professor Masur argues that “[c]ourts have diverged drastically from the 
principles outlined in Supreme Court administrative law jurisprudence when confronted 
with cases they understand as involving military or wartime matters.”  Masur, supra note 
3, at 443.  He asserts that the courts’ excessive deference is manifest in the failure “to 
require the Executive to put forth any meaningful quanta of proof in support of its 
determinations” or “to examine or challenge the logical reasoning and inferences . . . used 
by the Executive.”  Id. at 447. 
70 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“Nothing herein (1) affects . . . the power or duty of the 
court to . . . deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground . . . .”). 
71 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
72 475 U.S. 503, 506 (1986). 
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Supreme Court held in favor of the Air Force, stating “[j]udicial 
deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative action under the 
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules 
and regulations for their governance is challenged.”73  In Winter, the 
Court reiterated a statement from Goldman that it would “give great 
deference to the professional judgment of military authorities 
concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.” 74  
The Court in Winter also relied on Gilligan v. Morgan in which 
former Kent State University students alleged that the National Guard 
violated their rights of free speech and assembly when responding to 
civil disorder at the University.75  There the Supreme Court ruled for 
the National Guard, holding that the controversy was not justiciable.76  
In Winter, the Court reiterated its observation from Gilligan that the 
“essentially professional military judgments” concerning “the 
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force” are 
committed to the elected branches of the government.77 
The courts of appeals have relied on the same language from 
Gilligan when affording military decisions super-deference under the 
APA.  In Custer County Action Ass’n v. Garvey, the Tenth Circuit 
addressed a NEPA challenge to the FAA’s approval of changes to 
military airspace designed to accommodate F-16 training.78  The 
court reviewed the FAA’s decision under the APA79 and 
acknowledged that the military “is not excepted from [NEPA] 
requirements.”80  Nonetheless, the court gave “the political branches 
of [the] government a particularly high degree of deference” because 
the case concerned “military affairs.”81  The court went so far as to 
extend the military’s super-deference to the FAA and hold that the 
political question doctrine precluded the court from interfering with 
the FAA’s decision that the airspace changes were necessary.82 
The courts’ applications of super-deference in military cases under 
the APA are often more subtle than in Winter and Custer County.  In 
 
73 Id. at 508 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)). 
74 129 S. Ct. at 377 (quoting Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507). 
75 413 U.S. 1, 3 (1973). 
76 Id. at 11–12. 
77 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377 (quoting Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10). 
78 256 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 2001). 
79 Id. at 1029. 
80 Id. at 1029 n.5. 
81 Id. at 1031. 
82 Id.  The court of appeals went on to review whether “the FAA acted within the scope 
of its powers, followed its own regulations, and complied with the Constitution.”  Id. 
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cases concerning the correction of military service records, however, 
the courts expressly employ “an unusually deferential application of 
the arbitrary or capricious standard of the [APA] . . . calculated to 
ensure that the courts do not become a forum for appeals by every 
soldier dissatisfied with his or her ratings.”83  When the D.C. Circuit 
adopted that standard, it recognized that “the terms of § 706 of the 
APA apply alike to all agency actions subject to review thereunder.”84  
Nonetheless, the court held that the military is entitled to super-
deference because the statute that delegates the authority to correct 
military records gives the Secretary of Defense broad discretion,85 as 
do so many non-military statutes.86  The Second Circuit may have 
been standing on firmer ground when it based the application of 
super-deference in military records cases on “pragmatic limitations on 
the judiciary’s institutional competence” and the separation-of-powers 
doctrine.87 
B.  Empirical Evidence 
Empirical studies support the observation that, despite Congress’s 
deliberate and well-considered decision to subject all agency action 
that is reviewable under the APA to the same standard of review, the 
courts continue to apply different standards of review to different 
agencies.88  Recently, Professor William Eskridge and Lauren Baer 
 
83 Cone v. Caldera, 223 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Henry v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 77 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(“Review of a military agency’s ruling, moreover, must be extremely deferential because 
of the confluence of the narrow scope of review under the APA and the military setting.”). 
84 Kreis v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
85 Id. at 1514–15. 
86 For example, the D.C. Circuit recognized that the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act “shows Congress’ willingness to give the President wide discretion in dealing 
with issues affecting foreign assets during periods of international crisis.”  Am. Int’l Grp., 
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 443 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Chas. T. 
Main Int’l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 809 n.13 (1st Cir. 
1981)).  Reviewing an agency action taken pursuant to that Act under the APA’s arbitrary 
or capricious standard, the D.C. Circuit later “reiterate[d] that [its] review—in an area at 
the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and administrative law—is extremely 
deferential.”  Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
87 Falk v. Sec’y of the Army, 870 F.2d 941, 945 (2d Cir. 1989). 
88 See Bradley C. Canon & Michael Giles, Recurring Litigants: Federal Agencies 
Before the Supreme Court, 25 W. POL. Q. 183, 190 (1972) (“[T]he Supreme Court was 
considerably more receptive to the claims of some” agencies than others.); Donald W. 
Crowley, Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: Does the Type of Agency Matter?, 
40 W. POL. Q. 265, 267 (1987) (“[T]he Court is not uniformly deferential and shows 
substantial variation in support from agency to agency.”); Roger Handberg, The Supreme 
Court and Administrative Agencies: 1965–1978, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 161, 167, 173 (1979) 
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confirmed this finding in an empirical study of over one thousand 
Supreme Court cases between 1984 and 2006 “in which a federal 
agency interpretation of a statute was at issue.”89  The Court did not 
apply the familiar two-part test of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council90 across the board, but instead “employed 
a continuum of deference regimes”91 ranging from “super-deference” 
in cases implicating foreign affairs and national security to “anti-
deference” in criminal cases and cases in which the agency’s 
interpretation raised serious constitutional concerns.92  Agencies won 
an average of 68.8% of all of the cases included in the study.93  In 
cases implicating foreign affairs and national security, however, 
agencies won 78.5% of the time.94  Eskridge and Baer concluded that 
“super-strong deference to the government in the areas of foreign 
 
(finding “variations among agency support rates” an above-average success rate for the 
Department of Defense); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of 
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 778 n.86 (2008) (“Researchers have long 
observed wide differences across agencies in the rate at which the Supreme Court validates 
their decisions.”).  But see Reginald S. Sheehan, Administrative Agencies and the Court: A 
Reexamination of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes, 43 W. POL. Q. 875, 
881 (1990) (“There were no significant differences in levels of support for economic 
agencies as compared to social agencies.”). 
89 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1094. 
90 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  First, if “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue,” the agency must effectuate Congress’s express intent.  Id. at 842–43.  Second, “if 
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court should defer 
to the agency's interpretation, if it is reasonable.  Id. at 843. 
91 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1090. 
92 Id. at 1098–1100. 
93 Id. at 1127, 1129 tbl.7. 
94 Id. at 1102; see also id. at 1095 (“[B]ecause our dataset consists of the entire 
population of cases of interest to us, and not a sample of cases from the population . . . 
there is no need to conduct significance tests on the basic summary figures we lay out.”).  
In his study of court of appeals decisions implicating national security in the seven years 
following September 11, 2001, Professor Sunstein found that the government prevailed in 
eighty-five percent of the cases.  Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: 
An Empirical Investigation, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269, 277.  He observed that “very few 
areas of the law have been found to be so lopsided,” id., but found his data insufficient to 
determine whether that high validation rate was due to “the selection of cases for 
litigation,” id. at 282.  Professor Sunstein found it “clear,” however, that the courts “are 
usually giving the government the benefit of the doubt.”  Id. at 283.  Professor Steven 
Lichtman calculated a success rate of 66.3% in Supreme Court military cases between 
1918 and 2004.  Steven B. Lichtman, The Justices and the Generals: A Critical 
Examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Tradition of Deference to the Military, 1918–
2004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907, 914 (2006).  He found it not debatable that “the Supreme Court 
adopted an explicitly obeisant posture towards military judgment.”  Id. at 915. 
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affairs and national security remains a prominent part of the Court’s 
deference practice.”95 
In other subject areas, the agency fared nearly as well or better than 
in foreign affairs and national security cases.  In energy cases, for 
example, the agency prevailed 93.3% of the time.96  Agency win rates 
in intellectual property and pensions cases were also above 80%.97  
At the opposite end of the spectrum were cases concerning Indian 
affairs and federal lands, in which the agencies prevailed 51.6% and 
50% of the time, respectively—well below the average.98 
Eskridge and Baer found that “regardless of subject area, ad hoc 
judicial reasoning reigns,” and the Court’s deference practice was 
“wildly inconsistent.”99  In 16.7% of the foreign affairs and national 
security cases,100 the Court invoked the highly deferential standard of 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,101 and the agencies 
won across the board.102  In half of the foreign affairs and national 
security cases, the Court employed “consultative deference,”103 which 
“relies on some input from the agency (for example, amicus briefs, 
interpretive rules or guidance, or manuals) and uses that input to 
guide its reasoning and decisionmaking process.”104  And in the 
remaining one-third of foreign affairs and national security cases, the 
 
95 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1102.  Eskridge and Baer’s study thus bears out 
Professor Masur’s observation that “Article III courts have come to view military 
questions as a taxonomic grouping they are simply incapable of navigating.”  Masur, supra 
note 3, at 519. 
96 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1145 tbl.16.  For a discussion of whether super-
deference to agency scientific determinations is justified, see Emily Hammond Meazell, 
Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency 
Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733 (2011). 
97 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1145 tbl.16.  This finding is consistent with 
Professor Huq’s assertion that, when examined from the perspective of the remedy 
provided, the courts do not treat national security cases differently than other public law 
cases.  Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 
265 (arguing that theories that rely on the descriptive claim that national security cases are 
distinctive are flawed); see also Peck, supra note 57, at 60 (asserting that limitations on 
judicial review are not unique to the military).  Whether excessive deference to non-
military agencies is justifiable is beyond the scope of this Article. 
98 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1145 tbl.16. 
99 Id. at 1098, 1137. 
100 Id. at 1140 tbl.14. 
101 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“[C]ongressional legislation . . . within the international 
field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory 
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.”). 
102 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1099. 
103 Id. at 1140 tbl.14. 
104 Id. at 1098. 
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Court invoked no deference regime at all.105  The variety of deference 
regimes employed in other subject areas was similar.106 
Although the empirical studies have not been limited to APA cases, 
their observation that agencies typically enjoy super-deference in 
national security cases appears to hold true for the military under the 
APA.  Whether the courts regularly give the military super-deference 
in APA cases or do so only sporadically, however, is of little 
consequence to my analysis.  Any instance of giving the military 
more deference than other agencies under the APA is potentially 
problematic, for the reasons spelled out below.  Giving agencies like 
the Department of Energy and the State Department super-deference, 
or the Department of the Interior no deference at all, may or may not 
be problematic as well, but I leave those discussions for another 
day.107 
III 
THE PROBLEM OF GIVING THE MILITARY SUPER-DEFERENCE UNDER 
THE APA 
At first blush, the fact that agencies do not play on a level playing 
field under the APA is unremarkable.  It seems intuitive that courts 
should defer to the military.  But the judicial practice of giving the 
military heightened deference does not arise from an interpretation of 
the terms “arbitrary” or “capricious.”  Certainly those terms leave 
room for interpretation, but not relative to which agency is the 
defendant.  Thus, courts that give the military super-deference apply a 
common-law overlay that is inconsistent with the statutory text and as 
such raises separation-of-powers concerns.108 
Even if this judicial practice were premised on statutory 
interpretation of the arbitrary or capricious standard, it would raise 
democratic accountability concerns.  The adoption of a single 
standard of review for all agencies in the APA is a deliberate, express 
statutory command that Congress reached after years of hard-fought 
compromise with overwhelming support, and that has had a broad 
 
105 Id. at 1140 tbl.14. 
106 See id. at 1139–41 tbl.14. 
107 See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87 (2009) (arguing that foreign afffairs deference is outmoded). 
108 I need not and do not intend to take sides here in the larger debate about the validity 
of federal common law.  For purposes of this Article, it suffices to demonstrate, as I do 
below, that the common-law practice of giving the military super-deference in APA cases 
is unjustified. 
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normative effect on the law.  In these circumstances, Congress’s 
statement displaces the courts’ authority not just to fashion a 
common-law overlay, but also to interpret the statutory text in a way 
that shifts the balance Congress reached through the political process. 
The courts’ practice of giving the military super-deference in APA 
cases also undermines two of the APA’s basic goals—enhancing 
uniformity and augmenting judicial review—which Congress saw as 
critical to protecting individual liberties and avoiding totalitarianism.  
This unpredictability causes doctrinal confusion, which does not do 
agencies, plaintiffs, or regulated industries any favors.  It also raises 
concerns related to the hypocrisy of courts: they purport to keep 
agencies within the bounds of their delegated authority through rules 
of administrative common law, even though creating that common 
law may exceed the courts’ authority.  Likewise, courts emphasize the 
rule of law while defying rule-of-law values by singling out one 
agency for special treatment and leaving little restraint on the 
agency’s discretion.  Finally, this unpredictability is inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court’s slow but steady trend toward closer adherence to 
the text of the APA. 
A.  Common-Law Overlay 
Judicial lawmaking raises many concerns, including separation-of-
powers concerns.109  The federal courts exercise authority conferred 
by Congress; without statutory authority, they are not authorized to 
craft a common-law rule of decision.110  Following Professor 
Merrill’s lead, I refer to “federal common law” as “any federal rule of 
decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal 
text.”111  Federal common law was recognized to be “theoretically 
 
109 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.1, at 367–68 (5th ed. 2007); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
19 (1985). 
110 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, § 6.1, at 365.  Federal common law also raises 
federalism concerns in that, under the Constitution, the states reserved the powers that 
were not expressly given to federal government.  Id. 
111 Merrill, supra note 109, at 5; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, § 6.1, at 363 
(“The phrase federal common law refers to the development of legally binding federal law 
by the federal courts in the absence of directly controlling constitutional or statutory 
provisions.”); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 881, 890–96 & n.58 (1986) (adopting “a similarly broad definition of 
‘federal common law’”); Merrill, supra note 109, at 7 (“In short, federal common law, as I 
define it, refers to legal rules (substantive or procedural) that (1) are propounded by courts, 
that is, are not found on the face of an authoritative federal text, and (2) have the status of 
federal law.”).  But see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of 
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and constitutionally troubling”112 even before the Supreme Court’s 
declaration in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that “[t]here is no 
federal general common law.”113  The Supreme Court emphasized in 
TVA v. Hill that our government is “a tripartite one, with each branch 
having certain defined functions delegated to it by the 
Constitution.”114  The lawmaking power is vested in the legislative 
branch and is separated from the power to interpret the law, which is 
assigned to the judicial branch.  The drafters of the Constitution 
designed this separation of functions to avoid judicial tyranny115 and 
“safeguard[] liberty by dispersing governmental power.”116  Congress 
may, of course, delegate some lawmaking power to executive branch 
agencies, but “institutionalization of lawmaking by federal courts 
would represent a major shift in policymaking power away from 
Congress and toward the federal judiciary, in violation of the 
constitutional scheme.”117 
To be sure, federal common law survives “in limited 
circumstances.”118  Professor Chemerinsky postulates that “[f]ederal 
common law always has existed and always will exist”119 for at least 
three purposes: to fill in statutory gaps, “to fulfill congressional 
intent,” and “to protect the interests of the federal government.”120  
Federal common law of the statutory-gap-filling variety may be 
“easily justified” given the impossibility of drafting a truly complete 
 
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1403 n.504 (2001) (declining to follow Merrill’s 
definition because it does not draw the “theoretical distinction between judicial 
interpretation and judicial lawmaking”). 
112 Duffy, supra note 6, at 116. 
113 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, § 6.1, at 364 
(“There long has been a strong presumption against the federal courts fashioning common 
law to decide cases.”).  Professor Chemerinsky explains that the Rules of Decision Act of 
1789 directs federal courts to apply state law where positive federal law is lacking.  Id. 
114 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
115 Merrill, supra note 109, at 19; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he general liberty of the people can never be 
endangered” by the judiciary, so long as it “remains truly distinct from both the legislature 
and the executive.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (vesting the 
power of impeachment in the legislature guards against judicial usurpation of legislative 
authority). 
116 Manning, supra note 17, at 645; cf. Richard Stith, Securing the Rule of Law Through 
Interpretive Pluralism: An Argument from Comparative Law, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
401, 402 (2008) (arguing that, given the politicization of legal interpretation, consolidating 
the power of legal interpretation in a single high court yields judicial tyranny). 
117 Merrill, supra note 109, at 23. 
118 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, § 6.1, at 365. 
119 Id. at 367. 
120 Id. at 366. 
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statute,121 but it is hard to distinguish between statutory interpretation 
and common law.122  Professor Merrill referred to the practice of 
filling in the blanks of “broad, vague, or open-textured provisions” as 
“delegated lawmaking.”123  He posited that federal common law is 
permissible where the statute reveals Congress’s intent to delegate 
lawmaking power to the courts and circumscribes that delegation 
“with reasonable specificity.”124  To avoid “confusing legislative with 
judicial authority,” however, courts engaging in delegated lawmaking 
must be “scrupulously attentive” to the text of the statute and candid 
about whether they are interpreting the statute or filling in its gaps 
with common law.125 
Those theories are consistent with current jurisprudence.  In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, federal judicial common law was 
assumed to exist.126  In the twentieth century, the duty to elaborate on 
statutes shifted to federal agencies.127  Since Erie pronounced the 
death of the federal general common law in 1938, the Supreme Court 
has permitted federal common law in only a “few and restricted” 
areas “in which a federal rule of decision is necessary to protect 
uniquely federal interests, and those in which Congress has given the 
courts the power to develop substantive law.”128  The “new federal 
common law”129 is acknowledged to be a “judicial creation,”130 but it 
must have a textual basis in the Constitution or a statute,131 it may 
 
121 Id. § 6.3.1, at 387. 
122 Id. § 6.1, at 367; see also id. § 6.3.2, at 388. 
123 Merrill, supra note 109, at 34, 35. 
124 Id. at 41; see also Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and 
Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 436–37 (arguing that common law extends 
legislative influence when it replicates statutory purposes). 
125 Strauss, supra note 124, at 441. 
126 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1441, 1454 (2008). 
127 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 45 (1982); 
Eskridge, supra note 126, at 1455. 
128 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
129 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964). 
130 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) 
(“Unlike the general common law that preceded it, however, federal common law was 
self-consciously ‘made’ rather than ‘discovered . . . .’”). 
131 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, § 6.3.2, at 390 (“The federal judiciary will 
formulate a body of common law rules only pursuant to clear congressional intent for such 
action.”); Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing 
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 879 (2007) (“While there is much scholarly 
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only fill in the gaps left in those texts,132 and it must be consistent 
with the policy expressed in those texts.133 
The judicial practice of giving the military heightened deference 
under the APA is not a matter of statutory interpretation or gap filling.  
Professor Duffy correctly pointed out that the use of “open-ended 
language,” like “arbitrary” and “capricious,” left room for judicial 
interpretation that “presents no conflict with the theoretical 
constraints on federal common law.”134  While § 706 of the APA 
leaves ample room for the judiciary to engage in gap filling,135 
however, it leaves no room to interpret its terms relative to which 
agency is the defendant.136  In providing a uniform standard of review 
for all final agency action, Congress left the judiciary no discretion to 
apply different common-law standards of review to different 
agencies.  As Professor Duffy said, “[w]ith the enactment of the APA 
in 1946, the judicial method in most administrative law cases should 
have shifted to the task of interpreting the new statute, rather than 
continuing to formulate and apply judicially-created doctrines.”137  In 
particular, the enactment of the APA should have changed the scope 
of review,138 at least insofar as the statute subjected all agencies to the 
same standards.  Just as the Supreme Court held in FCC v. Fox 
 
debate about the proper contours of federal common law, there is widespread agreement 
that federal common law must be grounded in a federal law source.”); Andrew W. Davis, 
Note, Federalizing Foreign Relations: The Case for Expansive Federal Jurisdiction in 
Private International Litigation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1464, 1466 (2005); Duffy, supra note 
6, at 117. 
132 Bradley et al., supra note 131, at 880 (“[T]he post-Erie federal common law must be 
interstitial; that is, courts are to develop it only in retail fashion to fill in the gaps, or 
interstices, of federal statutory or constitutional regimes.”). 
133 Id. 
134 Duffy, supra note 6, at 153. 
135 Then-Professor Scalia argued that the APA’s failure to address informal 
adjudication procedures opened the door for federal courts to fashion common law to fill 
that gap.  Scalia, supra note 6, at 385, 391–92. 
136 Professors Levy and Glicksman recently observed that “the APA’s standards of 
review are stated in terms that are broad enough to encompass a variety of different 
formulations.”  Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 499, 572 (2011).  They cautioned, however, that agency-specific variations 
must “be justified by agency-specific statutes, programs, or practices.”  Id.  “Unfounded 
deviations from generally applicable APA provisions . . .  are improper.  They upset the 
congressional balance of autonomy and accountability and undermine the legislative goal 
of universality without justification.”  Id. 
137 Duffy, supra note 6, at 121; see also id. at 119 (“Things should have changed in 
1946 . . . because the courts’ method of analysis should have changed: Statutory law 
should have assumed the dominant position in cases covered by the APA . . . .”). 
138 Id. at 130. 
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Television Stations, Inc. that courts may not subject agency action to a 
stricter standard of review than that set forth in the APA, so too they 
should not subject it to a lesser standard of review or excuse it from 
review altogether based on a doctrine that has no “basis in the text of 
the statute.”139 
Like all federal common law, administrative common law140 
implicates separation-of-powers concerns.141  By ignoring the plain 
language of the APA and instead fashioning a judge-made rule, the 
practice of applying a super-deference standard in military cases 
under the APA undermines separation of powers.142  Congress chose 
to use narrow language in the “military authority” exception, 
obviously intending for military actions falling outside the scope of 
the exception, and not otherwise excluded, to be subject to judicial 
review.  The plain language of the APA itself mandates judicial 
review in appropriate cases.143  By giving the military super-
deference, the courts excuse the military from meaningful judicial 
 
139 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009). 
140 I use the phrase “administrative common law” to refer to judge-made law.  The 
phrase has also been used to refer to “agency-developed interpretations of law.”  Richard 
W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917, 920 n.16 
(2006) (citing Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 
1999)). 
141 Professor Wright argues, for example, that in applying the common-law timing 
doctrines of exhaustion, ripeness, and finality, the courts focus on Article III concerns and 
pay little heed to the Article II concerns raised by the courts’ intrusion on the executive 
branch’s autonomy.  R. George Wright, The Timing of Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Overlapping Doctrines, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 83, 91, 
93 (1987).  Professor Manning argues that deference to an agency’s interpretation of its 
own regulations under Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), violates 
separation-of-powers principles.  Manning, supra note 17, at 631–54. 
142 Cf. J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with a Wink and a Nod 
to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 35 (2010) (“The ‘uneasy coexistence’ of federal 
common law deference doctrines and the APA’s plain language raised provocative 
questions about the balance of powers between Congress, the federal judiciary, and the 
executive branch.”). 
143 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action     
. . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); id. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by 
statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are 
subject to judicial review.”); id. § 706 (“To the extent necessary to decision and when 
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the 
terms of an agency action.”); Duffy, supra note 6, at 130. 
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review in precisely the cases Congress determined should be 
reviewable.144 
B.  Democratic Accountability 
Closely related to the separation-of-powers concerns raised by the 
common-law nature of the super-deference standard are concerns 
related to the courts’ responsiveness to the democratic process.  Even 
if the courts attempted to justify the practice of giving the military 
heightened deference under the APA as statutory interpretation, it 
would be deeply troubling.  The history described in Part I 
demonstrates that Congress’s decision to subject all agencies to the 
same standard of review and to provide only a narrow military 
exception in the judicial review provisions of the final enactment 
resulted from a long and hard-fought legislative process and a 
monumental compromise.  The Supreme Court emphasized this when 
it adhered strictly to the statute’s text soon after its enactment. 
The Act thus represents a long period of study and strife; it settles 
long-continued and hard-fought contentions and enacts a formula 
upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest.  It 
contains many compromises and generalities and, no doubt, some 
ambiguities.  Experience may reveal defects.  But it would be a 
disservice to our form of government and to the administrative 
process itself if the courts should fail, so far as the terms of the Act 
warrant, to give effect to its remedial purposes where the evils at 
which it was aimed appear.145 
Judge Posner has long contended that “where the lines of 
compromise are discernable,” courts interpreting statutes should 
“follow them, to implement not the purposes of one group of 
legislators but the compromise itself.”146  Professor Clark agrees that 
where “compromise produces relatively clear and precise provisions   
. . . courts pursuing interpretive fidelity should strive to uphold the 
 
144 One might object that the APA merely codified the common law, and therefore any 
pre-existing practice of giving the military heightened deference would inform the 
meaning of the statute.  The APA, however, did not merely codify the common law, 
particularly not the provision of a single standard of review for all agencies.  See Kovacs, 
supra note 9, at 707–08. 
145 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40–41 (1950), quoted in Vt. Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523 (1978). 
146 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 289 (1985); 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 820 (1983). 
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specific compromises incorporated into enacted legal texts.”147  
Expanding the “military authority” exception beyond its bounds by 
giving super-deference to the military “defeat[s] the purpose (and 
benefits) of a multi-member, multihouse legislature checked by the 
executive”148 and disenfranchises “all who use the political process to 
register the democratic will.”149 
The APA, however, is far from a typical legislative compromise.  It 
resulted from seventeen years of legislative activity and passed with 
overwhelming support, and since its enactment, the APA has had a 
broad normative effect on the law.  In those circumstances, the courts 
should be particularly chary of interpreting the statutory text in a way 
that shifts the balance Congress reached through the political process.  
Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn conceived of statutes that are 
enacted “after lengthy normative debate” and that “prove robust as a 
solution, a standard, or a norm over time” as “super-statutes.”150  
Whether the APA qualifies as a “super-statute” under Eskridge and 
Ferejohn’s conception of the term is fodder for future inquiry.  For 
purposes of this discussion, it suffices to observe that the APA has 
many qualities of an Eskridgian “super-statute”: it was enacted during 
“the golden age of the super-statute,” 1938–1969;151 it emerged from 
a “lengthy period of public discussion and official deliberation”;152 
the principles it established, including the idea that agency action 
should be subject to judicial review, have become “foundational or 
axiomatic to our thinking”;153 it has “passe[d] the test of time”;154 
and whether or not the entire statute “alter[ed] substantially the then-
 
147 See Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421, 1421 (2008); cf. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 921 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (upholding “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy governing gays in the military) 
(“What Thomasson seeks to upset here is a carefully crafted national political compromise, 
one that was the product of sustained and delicate negotiations involving both the 
Executive and Legislative branches of our government.”); id. at 923 (emphasizing that 
policy is entitled to “judicial respect” because it resulted from “exhaustive efforts of the 
democratically accountable branches” and “month upon month of political negotiation and 
deliberation”). 
148 See Clark, supra note 147, at 1424. 
149 Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 923. 
150 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 
(2001); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., America’s Statutory “Constitution,” 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 36 (2007). 
151 See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 150, at 1227. 
152 Id. at 1231. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 1273. 
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existing regulatory baselines with a new principle or policy,”155 
certainly the concept of applying a uniform standard of review to all 
federal agencies was something new.156 
Eskridge and Ferejohn posited that “super-statutes” should be 
treated “as more normatively powerful than ordinary statutes.”157  
Accordingly, they argued that “super-statutes” should be interpreted 
liberally and dynamically, “in a common law way” to implement 
“statutory purpose and principle as well as compromises suggested by 
statutory texts.”158  Courts must also be mindful, they cautioned, “of 
cross-cutting costs and countervailing policies.”159  If the APA is 
treated as a “super-statute,” then, the “military authority” exception 
should be interpreted “broadly and evolutively.”160  The courts’ 
interpretation of the phrase “time of war,” for example, focuses on the 
nature of combat operations, correctly reflecting the modern dearth of 
formal declarations of war.161  Likewise, the phrase “in the field” 
should encompass any site of military operations, as Congress would 
have understood the term in 1946, and as reflects the nature of 
modern warfare.162  Interpreting the “military authority” exception 
broadly implements an important legislative compromise and, as 
 
155 Id. at 1230. 
156 Then-Professor Scalia observed in 1978 that “the Supreme Court regarded the APA 
as a sort of superstatute, or subconstitution, in the field of administrative process: a basic 
framework that was not lightly to be supplanted or embellished.”  Scalia, supra note 6, at 
363.  Other commentators agree that the APA has taken on quasi-constitutional status, 
though they do not necessarily agree about what implications that should have for its 
interpretation.  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 
1029, 1077 (2004) (“Although it is packaged as a statute, the APA is the product of 
constitutional thought, and the courts have given quasi-constitutional status to its 
provisions.”); William R. Andersen, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and a 
Proposal, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1017, 1033 (2006) (“The federal APA would be difficult to 
amend because it has acquired something like constitutional status . . . .”); Michael 
Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication Provisions to All 
Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2004) (“The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) has achieved virtually constitutional status.”); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1039, 1039 (1997) (opining that “our experience with the APA parallels that with the 
Constitution” and thus “the judicial gloss on the APA has taken on a large significance 
over time”); Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and 
Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 253 (1986) (“My thesis is a simple one: the APA is 
more like a constitution than a statute.”). 
157 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 150, at 1217. 
158 Id. at 1247; see also id. at 1234, 1247. 
159 Id. at 1248. 
160 Id. at 1249. 
161 See Kovacs, supra note 9, at 717–20. 
162 Id. at 712–17. 
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explained below, prevents the statute from encroaching on the 
President’s constitutional turf. 
By the same token, the terms of the APA as a whole should be 
interpreted to implement its “great[est] public purposes”: uniformity 
and judicial review.163  Applying a “super-deference” standard to the 
military singles out the military for special treatment and dilutes the 
standard of review, thus contradicting not only the plain language of 
the statute but also the principles this extraordinary statute 
embodies.164  Thus, that judicial practice is problematic on a deeper 
level than a simple error of statutory interpretation; it represents the 
courts’ failure to respect the democratic process. 
C.  The Values of the APA 
Putting aside the unusual nature of the APA, excusing the military 
from meaningful judicial review is also problematic simply because it 
undermines the values Congress sought to pursue in the APA.  The 
history of the APA’s enactment demonstrates that Congress believed 
judicial review of administrative action, including military action, was 
one of the keys to protecting individual liberties and avoiding 
totalitarianism, administrative bias, and overreaching.165  Congress 
intended “to retrench the administrative state and to reassert 
legislative and judicial control over administrative action.”166  The 
Act was also designed to increase uniformity in agency practices and 
procedures.167  The Supreme Court held in Dickinson v. Zurko that 
“grandfathered common-law variations” based only on ambiguous 
authority would undermine Congress’s desire “to bring uniformity to 
a field full of variation and diversity.”168 
 
163 Eskridge, supra note 150, at 36. 
164 Moreover, if the APA is a “super-statute,” the “military authority” exception should 
be interpreted broadly to implement the legislative compromise it embodies.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 235–37 (advocating a broad reading of the “military authority” 
exception on other grounds). 
165 See Kovacs, supra note 9, at 683–86, 695–96; see also Miles & Sunstein, supra note 
88, at 810 (“The enactment of the APA was based on concerns about agency bias and 
relative enthusiasm for judicial review.”). 
166 Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1138; see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 
U.S. 474, 483–89 (1951) (reviewing the legislative history of the APA and concluding that 
Congress intended to strengthen judicial review of agency action). 
167 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 
527 U.S. 150, 154, 155 (1999); Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 489. 
168 527 U.S. at 155. 
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Applying super-deference in military cases under the APA distorts 
the incentives Congress created in the Act to enhance judicial review 
and uniformity.  If the courts are unwilling to engage in meaningful 
review of military action, litigants are less likely to file suit.169  The 
agencies, in turn, adjust their actions to the “intensity of judicial 
review” and the  “likelihood of judicial invalidation.”170  The 
Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council observed that allowing courts to impose 
extra-textual procedural requirements on agencies would make 
judicial review “totally unpredictable” and would lead agencies to 
adopt the fullest procedures.171  Conversely, excusing the military 
from meaningful judicial review may lead the defense agencies to 
give only nominal attention to administrative requirements.172  
Agencies are motivated to expand their own authority.173  They “tend 
toward tunnel vision, where they pursue their statutory mission with 
varying degrees of diligence, but often without sufficient regard to a 
larger normative framework.”174  The APA was designed to 
counterbalance that tendency through judicial review.  Super-
deference to the military shifts that balance and risks the dangers 
Congress sought to avoid in the APA. 
 
169 Miles & Sunstein, supra note 88, at 803 (“If litigants are rational, the likelihood of 
success will affect their decision whether to litigate, and that likelihood will depend on the 
aggressiveness of arbitrariness review.”); Sunstein, supra note 94, at 271 (“[L]itigants are 
responsive to the likelihood of victory . . . .”). 
170 Miles & Sunstein, supra note 88, at 804 (intensity of review impacts “both the rate 
of challenges to agency decisions and the content of agency decisions”); see also id. at 781 
(“[L]itigants are likely to adjust their decisions in accordance with the intensity of review . 
. . .”); Sunstein, supra note 94, at 283 (“Perhaps the government is especially troubled by 
the prospect of judicial invalidation in national security cases, and perhaps it has taken 
strong steps to avoid losses in court.”). 
171 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 546–
47 (1978); see also Scalia, supra note 6, at 371 (“[I]t would almost always be preferable, 
in the individual case, to provide the additional procedures which one had reason to 
believe the Court of Appeals would require, rather than to gamble on Supreme Court 
review.”). 
172 See MAZUR, supra note 3, at 90 (“Institutions that do not have to explain their 
conduct . . . tend to become lazier in their decision making, because it is the anticipation of 
having to justify decisions and offer good reasons for a particular choice that sharpens the 
mind.”). 
173 Eskridge, supra note 126, at 1457, 1478; see also Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron 
Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 208–11 (2004) 
(summarizing ways in which an agency’s interpretation of a statute may serve the agency’s 
self-interest). 
174 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1174. 
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D.  Doctrinal Confusion and Judicial Hypocrisy 
Applying federal common law in judicial review of agency actions 
raises additional concerns.  In our federal system, all government 
action must be justified by some constitutional or statutory grant of 
authority.175  Courts reviewing administrative action thus require the 
agency to be authorized by some legislative grant.176  “Judicial 
oversight of administrative agencies is itself justified in terms of 
forcing governmental agencies to heed limitations on their 
authority.”177  “Under our separation-of-powers regime,” Judge Wald 
explained, Congress delegates powers to agencies, and the courts 
“ensure that the agencies do what Congress has told them to do and 
that they exercise discretionary power in a reasonable fashion.”178 
That judicial oversight entails some limitations.  Federal courts that 
force agencies to justify their actions by reference to some text may 
be expected to impose the same requirement on themselves.179  “[F]or 
[federal] courts policing the bounds of legitimate authority against 
other government officials, it is only fair that they similarly police the 
legitimate bounds of their own authority.”180  Additionally, if an 
agency cannot meet the standards Congress has established, “the 
showdown ought to be between the agency and Congress, where the 
 
175 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (“Congress and the President, like the courts, 
possess no power not derived from the Constitution.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that 
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”); Akhil Reed 
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1439–40 (1987); Kevin M. 
Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 579 n.184 (2005) (“The limited 
powers doctrine requires that federal government action be authorized either by statute or 
the Constitution.”). 
176 See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 20 (5th ed. 2002) (ensuring that administrative 
action is authorized by statute supports the “traditional rule of law values” of equal 
treatment and predictability); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975) (“[T]he traditional model [of 
administrative law] affords judicial review in order to cabin administrative discretion 
within statutory bounds . . . .”); David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule of 
Environmental Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2010) (“[T]he two primary 
elements of judicial review—ensuring that agency action is authorized by law and is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious—work together to substitute for the constitutional 
requirements that govern congressional action.”). 
177 Duffy, supra note 6, at 120. 
178 Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 
662 (1997) (expressing doubts about whether courts should “loosen up” on agencies that 
do not have the resources to comply with statutory requirements). 
179 Duffy, supra note 6, at 145. 
180 Id. 
KOVACS 1/31/2012  1:40 PM 
2011] Leveling the Deference Playing Field 611 
problem originates.”181  The courts should not adjust their standard of 
review to accommodate agencies that fall short.182  Thus, courts 
should not apply a super-deference standard in military cases under 
the APA absent some textual grant of authority.  If the military cannot 
meet the lenient standards established in the APA, Congress may 
address the situation,183 but the courts should not fashion common-
law to rules to bypass the statutory strictures. 
Administrative common law also raises rule-of-law concerns. 
Though the dimensions of “the rule of law” and, indeed, the concept 
itself are contested,184 “the main formulations of the Rule of Law do 
agree upon an assumption that law consists of rules.”185 
Commentators also generally agree that, under the rule of law, “[t]he 
same rules should apply to everyone,”186 and the law should restrain 
government discretion.187  Administrative common law may defy 
those strictures.  One commentator argued, for example, that the 
judicial practice of deferring to agency interpretations of their own 
regulations “should have no place in a system of limited government 
under the rule of law.”188  The courts’ practice of giving the military 
 
181 Wald, supra note 178, at 662. 
182 Id. at 662–63. 
183 See infra text accompanying notes 349–56. 
184 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Historical Origins of the Rule of Law in the American 
Constitutional Order, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 273 (2004) (examining “the 
historical foundations of the rule of law in the American constitutional order”); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 7 (1997); James Lanshe, Morality and the Rule of Law in American 
Jurisprudence, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1, 1 (2009) (“[M]oral values can, and must, 
play a role in jurisprudence and an American understanding of the rule of law.”); Margaret 
Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989) (suggesting that 
the rule of law concept should be reinterpreted). 
185 Fallon, supra note 184, at 8; Radin, supra note 184, at 782; see also Katie R. Eyer, 
Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 655 (2008) 
(“[A]ny system hoping to achieve the ideal of rule of law must have fixed general rules by 
which individual and government conduct can be judged.”). 
186 Eyer, supra note 185, at 655; see also Masur, supra note 3, at 493 (arguing that the 
rule of law requires all agencies to receive the same standard of review); Radin, supra note 
184, at 789–90 (identifying “consistency” as an element shared by different conceptions of 
the “rule of law”). 
187 Eyer, supra note 185, at 655; Masur, supra note 3, at 491 (the rule of law requires 
agencies to act within the bounds of their statutory authority); John C. Reitz, Export of the 
Rule of Law, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429, 444 (2003) (“One must 
concede, however, that there is a tension between the rule of law and administrative 
discretion.”). 
188 Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t 
Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 12 (1996); see also id. at 24 (stating with regard to 
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super-deference in APA cases defies the rule-of-law tenet that rules 
should be applied consistently: the APA provides that all agencies are 
subject to the same standard of review, but the courts fashion agency-
specific standards.  Super-deference also leaves the military more 
room to maneuver than Congress contemplated, thus violating the 
rule-of-law tenet that rules should cabin government discretion.189 
One might argue that stability is also a rule-of-law value190 and 
abandoning the longstanding practice of deferring to the military 
would upset settled expectations.  Professor Strauss criticized the 
Supreme Court’s tendency to interpret statutes as “static, isolated 
instructions” instead of as part of a unified system of statutes and 
developing common law.191  He pointed out that administrative law 
changes constantly and courts, like agencies, should interpret statutes 
not solely by reference to their meaning at the time of enactment but 
also in light of subsequent developments in the law.192  Doing so, he 
posited, furthers the purposes of the statute and avoids defeating 
expectations that have arisen in the interim between enactment and 
judicial review.193  Professor Strauss applauded the courts for having 
“kept the APA more or less in step with developing 
understandings,”194 but he cautioned that courts should avoid 
“judicial adventurism.”195 
 
Chevron’s failure to mention section 706 of the APA, “In a democracy ever striving to 
achieve a rule of law, the Court’s laconic stance seems arrogant and dysfunctional.”). 
189 See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 555 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“[I]t is 
central to the rule of law in our constitutional system that federal courts must, in 
appropriate circumstances, review or second guess, and indeed sometimes even trump, the 
actions of the other governmental branches.”); Masur, supra note 3, at 452 (“[A]dherence 
to the rule of law requires greater involvement than courts currently undertake.”); id. at 
501 (“Meaningful judicial scrutiny of the factual predicates for administrative decisions is 
a necessary condition for ensuring that the rule of law prevails, even as applied to expert 
executive agencies acting within their assigned fields.”). 
190 Eyer, supra note 185, at 655 (“The law should be relatively consistent and stable, so 
as to facilitate the ability of those governed by it to plan for the future.”); Fallon, supra 
note 184, at 8 (“The law should be reasonably stable, in order to facilitate planning and 
coordinated action over time.”). 
191 Strauss, supra note 124, at 436–37; see also Radin, supra note 184, at 818–19 
(advocating a “pragmatic normative” conception of the rule of law). 
192 Strauss, supra note 124, at 437; see also Metzger, supra note 6, at 508 (noting “the 
evolving nature of ordinary administrative law”). 
193 Strauss, supra note 124, at 437, 505–06; see also Levin, supra note 6, at 298–302 
(arguing that remand without vacatur should be available under the APA because, inter 
alia, inflexibility “can upset a legal regime on which many citizens depend” and around 
which “citizens will already have arranged their expectations”). 
194 Strauss, supra note 124, at 491. 
195 Id. at 442. 
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While we might argue about the meaning of the terms “arbitrary” 
and “capricious” or the phrase “military authority exercised in the 
field in time of war,” the APA is clear that all final agency action that 
is reviewable under the statute is to be assessed using the same 
standard of review.  To the extent that the military has grown to rely 
on the courts’ tendency to give it super-deference, reliance on that 
“judicial adventurism” is misplaced.  Administrative common law is 
“inherently unstable” in that it lacks any statutory grounding.196  
Implementing the plain language of the APA, on the other hand, 
would lend some predictability to this constantly morphing area of the 
law.197 
E.  The Supreme Court’s Narrowing of APA Common Law 
The Supreme Court has refused to supplement the APA on several 
notable occasions, beginning around the time the Court started to pull 
back on federal common law.198  In Vermont Yankee, the Court 
observed that the APA “was not only ‘a new, basic and 
comprehensive regulation of procedures in many agencies,’ . . . but 
was also a legislative enactment which settled ‘long-continued and 
 
196 Duffy, supra note 6, at 141; see also id. at 142 (“Inconsistent with statute, 
inconsistent with itself, this administrative common law can no longer be considered 
stable.”); id. at 161 (“[E]ven time-honored judicial doctrines supported by decades of 
precedent cannot be considered stable law if they lack a foothold in statutory or 
constitutional text.”); Robert G. Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. 
L. REV. 17, 87 (1990) (“The result of judicial disregard for clear statutory meaning has 
been that the law as applied is more unstable, unpredictable, inaccessible, and, perhaps, 
more unfair than it would have been in a pure common law system.”); Kieran 
Ringgenberg, United States v. Chrysler: The Conflict Between Fair Warning and 
Adjudicative Retroactivity in D.C. Circuit Administrative Law, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 914, 
930 (1999) (“[T]he expansive fair warning rule is unmoored common law, legally 
unstable, and suitable for such modification as experience demonstrates is appropriate.”). 
197 See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 136, at 574 (“For private parties, legal 
uncertainty increases information costs, requires additional planning, and creates risk.  For 
agencies, legal uncertainty may increase information and planning costs, undermine 
compliance and enforcement, and distort agency policy.  For courts, legal uncertainty leads 
to litigation and makes settlement more difficult because parties may entertain 
substantially different assessments of the likely outcome of litigation.”). 
198 Duffy, supra note 6, at 139 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) and 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)); see also Levin, supra note 6, at 
309 (observing that the Supreme Court “has adopted literal or otherwise inflexible 
readings of other sections of the APA, even in the face of longstanding lower court 
interpretations pointing in a contrary direction”).  Then-Professor Scalia opined that, by 
1973, it was “obvious even to the obtuse that the Supreme Court” believed the APA “was 
not lightly to be supplanted or embellished . . . by a continually evolving judge-made 
common law not based upon constitutional prescriptions or rooted in the language of the 
APA itself.”  Scalia, supra note 6, at 363. 
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hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing 
social and political forces have come to rest.’”199  The rulemaking 
provisions, the Court held, “established the maximum procedural 
requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose 
upon agencies.”200  The circumstances in which a court may impose 
procedural requirements beyond those enumerated in the statute “are 
extremely rare.”201  Then-Professor Scalia said that the issue in 
Vermont Yankee was the “fundamental question of the status of the 
APA as the basic charter of judicially enforceable administrative 
procedure”202 and that the Supreme Court “definitively rejected” the 
courts’ “common-law power” to supplement the APA.203  Scalia 
opined that Vermont Yankee set “a new tone . . . of judicial restraint 
and of great deference to the text . . . of the APA.”204 
Darby v. Cisneros,205 in turn “ended the judge-made [exhaustion] 
doctrine’s domination over the APA.”206  Again, the Court refused to 
engraft procedural requirements that were not mandated by the plain 
language of the APA.207  The following term, the Court stayed the 
course of adhering to the text of the APA when it invalidated a 
Department of Labor burden-shifting rule in Director, Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, declaring 
that “the Department cannot allocate the burden of persuasion in a 
manner that conflicts with the APA.”208  In Dickinson v. Zurko, the 
Court held that the standards of review in § 706 of the APA guide 
Federal Circuit review of Patent and Trademark Office findings of 
fact, despite years of contrary practice.209  Most recently, in FCC v. 
 
199 435 U.S. 519, 523 (1978) (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36, 
40 (1950)). 
200 Id. at 524. 
201 Id.; see also Meazell, supra note 96, at 758–59 (discussing separation-of-powers 
concerns underlying Vermont Yankee); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 88, at 770–71 
(Vermont Yankee “emphasized that judges had no business burdening agencies with duties 
that could not be found in the APA or some other source of law.”). 
202 Scalia, supra note 6, at 359. 
203 Id. at 389–90; see also id. at 395 (Vermont Yankee “has put to rest the notion that the 
courts have a continuing ‘common-law’ authority to impose procedures not required by 
the Constitution in the areas covered by the APA.”). 
204 Id. at 396.  Of course, not all commentators agree with Scalia’s assessment of 
Vermont Yankee.  See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 6, at 182. 
205 509 U.S. 137 (1993). 
206 Duffy, supra note 6, at 153. 
207 Darby, 509 U.S. at 146–47. 
208 512 U.S. 267, 281 (1994). 
209 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999). 
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Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Supreme Court held that agency 
action that reverses course may not be subjected to a stricter standard 
of review than that set forth in the APA because “[t]he Act mentions 
no such heightened standard.”210 
There are, of course, notable exceptions to this trend.  In Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,211 for example, 
the Court made no effort to reconcile with the text of the APA its 
holding that agency interpretations of statutes are entitled to 
deference.212  The Supreme Court’s failure to even attempt to 
reconcile its analysis in Chevron with the text of the APA stands in 
stark contrast to its earlier allegiance to the text in Vermont 
Yankee.213  But the Supreme Court has begun in recent decades to pay 
closer attention to the text of the APA, at least in some circumstances.  
I turn next to the question why the federal courts have clung so 
tenaciously to administrative common law when reviewing military 
action under the APA, and to the question whether affording the 
military super-deference is justified. 
IV 
POTENTIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SUPER-DEFERENCE TO THE 
MILITARY 
Is there is an adequate justification that overrides the concerns 
discussed above for departing from the plain text of § 706 in APA 
cases against the military?214  The APA itself already protects the 
 
210 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009). 
211 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
212 Duffy, supra note 6, at 191, 192; Goering, supra note 142, at 36; Manning, supra 
note 17, at 621; Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 833, 868 (2001) (“If Chevron is a judicially developed norm, it is particularly difficult 
to explain why the doctrine supersedes the instruction in the APA that courts are to ‘decide 
all relevant questions of law.’”).  Chevron has been criticized on other grounds as well.  
E.g., Clark, supra note 112, at 1434 (arguing that Chevron is in tension with “the 
traditional presumption against preemption”); Eskridge, supra note 126, at 1443 
(suggesting that Chevron should be read narrowly in preemption cases); Manning, supra 
note 17, at 621 (observing that Chevron is in tension with Marbury v. Madison). 
213 Cf. Metzger, supra note 6, at 494 n.48 (“The Court’s refusal [in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 463 
U.S. 29 (1983)] to address whether extensive substantive scrutiny accords with the 
intentions of Congress in adopting the APA stands in particular contrast to its insistence 
that courts not impose procedural controls beyond those in the APA.”). 
214 Asking this question reveals that I do not intend to present an originalist argument.  
Rather, I assume that there may be reasons for courts to bypass the plain language of a 
statute.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (arguing that statutory interpretation is 
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military from judicial oversight by exempting “military authority 
exercised in the field in time of war” from the Act’s judicial review 
provisions.  That exemption provides much of the cover to which the 
military is entitled under the Constitution.  No other concern is 
sufficient to justify the broad application of a common-law standard 
of review that is inconsistent with the statutory standard and that 
singles out the military for exceptional treatment despite Congress’s 
deliberate decision to treat all agencies alike.215 
A.  Constitutional Status 
The most obvious and potentially compelling justification for 
giving the military super-deference under the APA is to avoid 
intruding on the President’s power as Commander in Chief.216  For 
Congress to permit the judiciary to second-guess the President’s 
substantive judgment when acting in his role as Commander in Chief 
or to impose procedural impediments to his actions raises separation-
of-powers concerns and potentially harms national security. 217  As 
former Solicitor General Ted Olson said, 
 
and should be grounded in a practical reasoning process).  I argue that there is no sufficient 
justification for bypassing the plain language of the APA in cases against the military. 
215 Other commentators have called on the courts to abandon super-deference to the 
military, but none have recognized that the breadth of the “military authority” exception 
answers constitutional concerns with judicial review of quintessentially military decisions.  
Eskridge and Baer “urge the [Supreme] Court to abandon” the super-deference standard of 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“[C]ongressional 
legislation . . . within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of 
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were 
domestic affairs alone involved.”), and instead subject agency decisions in foreign affairs 
and national security cases to the same standard of review as decisions in other subject 
matter areas.  Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1184–85.  They point out that other 
deference regimes are already sufficiently protective of the executive branch’s discretion.  
Id. at 1185.  Professor Masur urges the courts not “to invoke ‘national security’ as a 
shibboleth” to avoid applying basic principles of administrative law to the military in 
wartime.  Masur, supra note 3, at 521. 
216 The Commander in Chief Clause provides: “The President shall be Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, 
when called into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 
1.  The scope of that authority is subject to intense academic and judicial debate.  See, e.g., 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591–92 (2006); id. at 679–81 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 689 (2008); Heidi Kitrosser, It Came From Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping 
and Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (2010); Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures 
Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683 (2009). 
217 See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 526–27 (1988) (suggesting that 
judicial review of decisions committed to the President as Commander in Chief is 
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The judiciary is not equipped to evaluate combat decisions, to 
decide how to deploy troops to counter or deter enemy combatants, 
to make fast-paced decisions on which the outcome of a battle may 
determine, or to micromanage the infinite number of daily decisions 
that the Commander in Chief and his subordinates must make.  And 
the Executive cannot possibly conduct those decisions with energy 
and dispatch if his every wartime decision is subject to real-time 
judicial review.218 
Those concerns counter-balance the separation-of-powers concerns 
raised by giving the military super-deference in APA cases. 
The President, however, cannot be sued under the APA.  In 
Franklin v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that the President 
is neither expressly included nor expressly excluded from the 
APA.219  “Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique 
constitutional position of the President,” the Court refused to subject 
the President to the APA’s requirements based on “textual 
silence.”220  Of course, the rule that the President is not amenable to 
suit under the APA is a common-law rule in that it is not mandated by 
the text of the APA.221  But the Franklin rule is permissible because it 
is gap filling that does not contradict any explicit provision of the 
 
circumscribed); John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference 
Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161, 166 (2000) (“[B]ecause the Constitution did not explicitly 
indicate any involvement by the judiciary in governing the armed forces, there was 
considerable doubt initially as to whether the courts should have any role in reviewing the 
military judgments of the political branches.”); Peck, supra note 57, at 74 (“The fact that a 
decision is within the discretion of the military, and therefore of the executive branch of 
government, brings into play the principle of separation of powers, the major basis of the 
entire concept of nonreviewability.”); Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1133 (“There are too 
many domains affecting national security in which official opinion holds unanimously, 
across institutions and partisan lines and throughout the modern era, that executive action 
must proceed untrammeled by even the threat of legal regulation and judicial review, no 
matter how deferential that review might be on the merits.”).  But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (rejecting “the Government’s assertion that separation of powers 
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts” in reviewing military 
detentions of citizens); Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 
1165, 1215–16 (arguing that judicial review of facts supporting detention of enemy 
combatants does not violate separation of powers). 
218 Theodore B. Olson, Tex Lezar Memorial Lecture, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 15 
(2004) (concluding that separation of powers insulates the President’s decisions as 
Commander in Chief from judicial review). 
219 505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992). 
220 Id. at 800–01; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 470 (1994).  See generally 
Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1612, 1617–21 (1997) (analyzing Franklin v. Massachusetts). 
221 See supra note 220 and accompanying text; see also Vermeule, supra note 16, at 
1108 (the rule that the President is not an “agency” under the APA “is not obvious from 
the text of the APA’s definition”). 
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APA and because the Court acknowledged that it was reaching 
beyond the plain text of the statute.222 
The Franklin rule provides a complete answer to concerns about 
judicial review under the APA interfering with the President’s 
authority as Commander in Chief.  As then-Professor Elena Kagan 
explained,223 Franklin concerned an action that Congress had 
committed to the President’s sole discretion: calculation and 
transmittal to Congress of the census.224  In cases concerning actions 
that Congress has delegated to an agency head, in contrast, even if the 
President directs the action, he “effectively has stepped into the shoes 
of an agency head, and the review provisions usually applicable to 
that agency’s action should govern.”225 
Other proponents of the unitary executive theory might disagree.  
Some commentators posit that all executive power is vested in the 
President, and the President’s appointees merely “help[] him exercise 
his constitutional authority.”226  On that theory, judicial review of any 
executive branch officer has the potential to interfere with the 
President’s power as Commander in Chief.227  Thus, further analysis 
is required to convince proponents of a strong unitary executive 
 
222 See supra text accompanying notes 130–34. 
223 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2351 (2001). 
224 Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800. 
225 Kagan, supra note 223, at 2351; see also id. at 2369 (“[W]hen the President directs 
or otherwise involves himself in action taken pursuant to a delegation to an agency official 
. . . the APA’s judicial review provisions should apply.”); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s 
Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 290 & n.121 (2006); 
Daniel P. Rathbun, Note, Irrelevant Oversight: “Presidential Administration” from the 
Standpoint of Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 107 MICH. L. REV. 643, 645–46 (2009) 
(“[A]rbitrary and capricious review can be easily and appropriately applied to agency 
decisions, even in cases of presidential involvement . . . .”). 
226 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 595 (1994); see also Stack, supra note 225, at 302–03 
(“[D]efenders of a strongly unitary conception of the executive argue that the Constitution 
requires that the President control all power vested in the executive branch . . . .”); Mark 
Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 313, 318–25 (2010) (describing emergence of a strong unitary executive theory 
under which all executive power must be within the President’s control). 
227 See David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 540 
(2008) (executive branch officers, “not the president personally, exercise the commander 
in chief’s day-to-day operational functions”); Rachel Ward Saltzman, Executive Power 
and the Office of Legal Counsel, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 439, 443–46 (2010) 
(describing Office of Legal Counsel memos following 9/11 which advocated broad 
executive power); cf. Kagan, supra note 223, at 2373, 2380 (advocating a variable 
deference regime turning on the role of the President in an agency’s decision making). 
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theory that super-deference to the military under the APA is 
unwarranted. 
The President’s power as Commander in Chief generally bears 
some nexus to combat.228  The Supreme Court has defined the 
President’s power to include the “command of the forces and the 
conduct of campaigns”229 and “the power to wage war.”230  Thus, 
many APA cases against executive branch officers concerning 
military action will be insulated from judicial review by the exception 
for “military authority exercised in the field in time of war.”  For 
example, because “in the field” may encompass domestic training 
locations231 and a “time of war” can exist without a congressional 
declaration of war,232 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. fell within the scope of the “military authority” exception, and 
the case should have been dismissed.233 
In A History of the Military Authority Exception in the 
Administrative Procedure Act, I advocated a generous reading of the 
“military authority” exception due to its status as an exception to a 
waiver of federal sovereign immunity.234  The separation-of-powers 
concern about judicial review intruding on the President’s 
Commander in Chief power provides another reason to read the 
exception generously.  A broad interpretation of the exception might 
avoid constitutional infirmity and avoid the need to decide the extent 
to which the Commander in Chief power insulates the military from 
 
228 See Masur, supra note 3, at 448 (asserting that the Supreme Court has read the 
Commander in Chief Clause “broadly to encompass nearly any necessary war-related 
actions”); cf. Barron & Lederman, supra note 216, at 696 (“[T]he text and evidence of 
original understanding provide substantial support only for the recognition of . . . a 
prerogative of superintendence when it comes to the military chain of command itself.”); 
id. at 750–51 (“One prominent contention regarding the nature of the President's central 
war powers prerogatives is that the Commander in Chief Clause, at its core, establishes 
that ‘the president has tactical command once Congress decides troops should be used.’”). 
229 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139 (1866); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 591–92 (2006). 
230 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942); see also Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 
(1850) (“His duty and his power are purely military.  As commander-in-chief, he is 
authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his 
command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and 
conquer and subdue the enemy.”). 
231 See Kovacs, supra note 9, at 712–13. 
232 See id. at 719. 
233 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).  Given that the Supreme Court decided to allow the case to 
proceed, it should have reviewed the Navy’s action as it would any other agency’s action 
and not given super-deference to the Navy. 
234 Kovacs, supra note 9, at 720. 
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judicial review.235  Read broadly, the “military authority” exception 
will often protect the President’s power as Commander in Chief from 
judicial interference.  Hence, in most cases, the federal common law 
of giving super-deference to the military “is no longer ‘necessary’ and 
should be deemed to have been displaced” by the APA.236 
Even if the “military authority” exception is read broadly, however, 
some cases may slip through the cracks and into the courtroom.  The 
Constitution grants the President the power to act as Commander in 
Chief not only in times of war but also in peacetime.237  Actions 
taken in times of peace, however, are not covered by the “military 
authority” exception because the exception is limited to actions taken 
in “time of war.” 
The precise scope of the President’s Commander in Chief power 
during peacetime is debatable,238 but for many actions that are 
 
235 See Metzger, supra note 6, at 519, 531.  Professor Metzger advocates the use of the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, among others, as a means of getting agencies “to take 
constitutional concerns seriously.”  Id. at 531.  She recognizes, though, that this doctrine 
has been subject to scholarly criticism.  Id. at 531–32; see also Merrill, supra note 109, at 
54 (“[A] body of common law rules ‘inspired’ but not ‘required’ by the Constitution 
presents . . . serious problems of legitimacy” in that it violates principles of federalism, 
separation of powers, and electoral accountability); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander 
Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 98 (advocating abandonment of the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance and urging courts to “focus directly on whether, in any particular 
case, judges should substitute their judgment for that of Congress, instead of invoking the 
unwarranted assumption that by ‘merely’ interpreting a statute they have been respectful 
of the prerogatives and the status of a coordinate branch of government”). 
236 See Merrill, supra note 109, at 57 (arguing that codification of a constitutionally 
adequate common law rule removes the courts’ authority to continue to develop the 
common law); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 153–54 (1993) (recognizing that 
“Congress effectively codified the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies” in 
the APA and thus removed the courts’ power “to impose an exhaustion requirement as a 
rule of judicial administration”). 
237 Barron & Lederman, supra note 216, at 771 n.260 (“[T]he Commander in Chief 
Clause itself does not distinguish between war and peace . . . .”); Robert H. Jackson, 
Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 58, 61 (1941) 
(“These powers exist in time of peace as well as in time of war.”); Christopher Kutz, 
Torture, Necessity, and Existential Politics, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 235, 247 n.46 (2007) 
(“[T]he President is Commander in Chief in peace as well as war . . . .”); Saikrishna 
Prakash, Regulating the Commander in Chief: Some Theories, 81 IND. L.J. 1319, 1322 
n.13 (2006) (observing that “the President is CINC whether we are at war or not”); 
Vanessa Patton Sciarra, Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track 
Guarantee Procedure, 97 YALE L.J. 1439, 1443 (1988) (“The commander-in-chief clause 
has historically been seen to provide the Executive with wide-ranging power over military 
matters even in peacetime.”). 
238 See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 984 (2008) (antebellum 
constitutional treatises indicated that Congress could control the military during 
peacetime); Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
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potentially subject to an APA claim, Congress has concurrent239 and 
superseding power.240  The Constitution assigns Congress the power 
to “declare War . . . and make Rules concerning Captures on Land 
and Water,”241 “raise and support Armies,”242 “provide and maintain 
a Navy,”243 and “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 
the land and naval Forces.”244  The Supreme Court has held that “the 
Constitution contemplates that Congress has ‘plenary control over 
rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military 
Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies 
related to military discipline.’”245  Congress also has “broad and 
sweeping” spending powers246 that give it the authority “to determine 
not only how money shall be spent on military functions, but also 
how appropriated funds shall not be spent.”247  Even more far-
reaching is Professors Barron and Lederman’s argument that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to 
“‘exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to carry into 
execution the constitutional powers of the government’ as a whole, 
 
REV. 1299, 1319 (2004) (“[T]he commander in chief probably can do more (as a matter of 
constitutional law) in times of war than he can in peacetime.”). 
239 See Barron & Lederman, supra note 216, at 726 (describing the “reciprocity model” 
pursuant to which “the war powers of each political branch are presumed to be extensive 
and, for that reason, blended and overlapping with those of the competing branch”); 
Geoffrey Corn, Triggering Congressional War Powers Notification: A Proposal to 
Reconcile Constitutional Practice with Operational Reality, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
687, 696–97 (2010) (noting consensus that “the authority to initiate, sustain, and execute 
war was deliberately diffused between Congress and the President”); Luban, supra note 
227, at 542 (“[T]he argument for overlapping or concurrent powers appears a lot more 
appealing.”). 
240 See Barron & Lederman, supra note 216, at 771 n.260 (“[N]ot many would argue 
that Congress cannot regulate the way in which, for instance, affairs at the Pentagon are 
arranged in peacetime.”); Kutz, supra note 237, at 246–47 & n.46 (criticizing “the 
extraordinary claim that statutes cannot be construed, as a matter of constitutional law, to 
restrain the Commander in Chief’s war powers”). 
241 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
242 Id. at cl. 12. 
243 Id. at cl. 13. 
244 Id. at cl. 14.  Congress also has the authority to call forth, organize, arm, and 
discipline the militia.  Id. at cl. 15, 16. 
245 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 
U.S. 296, 301 (1983)); see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 216, at 733; Luban, supra 
note 227, at 523 (observing that “to keep the president’s war powers in check . . . the 
Constitution hives off important powers of war and peace from the executive and gives 
them to Congress”). 
246 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58 
(2006) (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). 
247 Barron & Lederman, supra note 216, at 734. 
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including the powers that the Constitution vests in the President.”248  
Thus, Congress had the authority to enact the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, which among other things requires the President as 
Commander in Chief to comply with the laws of war.249 
Most APA cases against the military in peacetime do not implicate 
military readiness;250 instead, they concern run-of-the-mill 
administrative activities concerning personnel and facilities—areas in 
which Congress may override the President.251  The military records 
cases discussed in Part II.A., for example,252 are within Congress’s 
purview.  Congress may establish standards of review for agency 
action taken pursuant to power it has delegated253 and may put the 
military on par with other agencies in cases within Congress’s 
preclusive range without raising constitutional concerns.  The courts’ 
practice of giving the military super-deference in peacetime cases 
gives the military more protection than Congress specified in the APA 
and more protection than the military requires to safeguard its 
interests.254 
There potentially remains a sliver of actions, pursuant to the 
Commander in Chief powers in peacetime, which Congress may not 
override.  Professors Barron and Lederman refer to such powers as 
“preclusive” in that “they would supersede any effort by Congress to 
use its own constitutional authorities to enact statutes that would limit 
the discretion the President would otherwise be constitutionally 
entitled to exercise.”255  In the very least, this narrow category 
includes the President’s authority to act “as civilian superintendent of 
 
248 Id. at 735 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 420–21 (1819)). 
249 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 599 n.31, 602, 628 (2006); Barron & 
Lederman, supra note 216, at 719 n.85. 
250 See Peck, supra note 57, at 3 (“Cases involving purely military activities, such as 
preparation for and conduct of combat operations, are relatively rare.”); cf. Chesney, supra 
note 3, at 1420 (“[N]ot all ‘national security’ cases are alike . . . . Some interests may truly 
be paramount, others quite ordinary.”). 
251 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1164 (Article I “accords Congress primacy in the 
regulation of . . . the governance of the armed forces.”). 
252 See supra text accompanying notes 84–88. 
253 Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial 
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 215–16 (2001); Stack, supra note 225, at 
300–01. 
254 Cf. Peck, supra note 57, at 68 (“To preclude judicial review altogether when abuse 
of discretion is alleged would be to extend to the military greater deference than is 
necessary to safeguard its legitimate interests.”). 
255 Barron & Lederman, supra note 216, at 694 n.6. 
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the military.”256  Thus, Congress may not “delegate the ultimate 
command of the army and navy . . . to anyone other than the 
President.”257  An APA claim implicating the President’s preclusive 
powers in peacetime might be covered by another exception, such as 
the exception for action “committed to agency discretion by law”258 
or the political question doctrine.259  If a sliver of cases implicating 
the President’s power as Commander in Chief remains subject to 
judicial review under the APA, however, those few cases do not 
justify the broad application of super-deference to the military under 
the APA, particularly not if courts apply the arbitrary or capricious 
standard in the deferential manner Congress intended. 
B.  Expertise 
The APA does not define the arbitrary or capricious standard, and 
the terms leave room for judicial interpretation.260  Such federal 
common law is permissible so long as it does not contradict the 
statute and the court acknowledges that it is filling in a statutory 
gap.261  The Supreme Court has elaborated on the arbitrary or 
capricious standard in that manner, holding that it requires only a 
“rational foundation” for agency action.262  Rationality review may 
sweep various considerations into the courts’ analysis.263  I turn now 
 
256 Id. at 737; see also id. at 767 (the Commander in Chief clause removed the 
legislature’s “power to appoint, and to remove, the military commander”). 
257 Id. at 769; see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 238, at 1102 (“[I]t is difficult to 
construe the words of the Commander in Chief Clause not to establish some indefeasible 
core of presidential superintendence of the army and the navy . . . .”); Luban, supra note 
227, at 485 (“No ‘war powers’ beyond the narrow power of military command are implicit 
in the Commander in Chief Clause . . . .”); id. at 566 (arguing that only “the power of 
command” is preclusive); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial and Imperiled: The 
Curious State of the Executive, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1021, 1038 (2008) (“Congress 
cannot establish independent military officers, for if it did, the President would not be 
Commander in Chief of the entire armed forces.”). 
258 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006). 
259 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
260 See supra text accompanying notes 135–36. 
261 See supra text accompanying note 126. 
262 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
263 Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible 
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise. 
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to an examination of whether any of those considerations warrant 
giving the military super-deference in APA cases. 
Agency expertise commonly enters into arbitrary or capricious 
review.  The Supreme Court held in Motor Vehicle Manufacturer’s 
Ass’n v. State Farm that an agency action will not satisfy that 
standard if its decision “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed 
to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”264  The 
Court looks to the agency’s “relative expertness” when reviewing the 
agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers,265 and the Court is 
particularly deferential in cases concerning complex, technical areas 
that “require significant expertise.”266  Most recently, Justice 
Kennedy, in his concurrence in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
opined that an agency’s change of policy is not arbitrary or capricious 
when its proffered reasons, “viewed in light of the data available to it, 
and when informed by the experience and expertise of the agency, 
suffice to demonstrate that the new policy rests upon principles that 
are rational, neutral, and in accord with the agency’s proper 
understanding of its authority.”267  The dissenting Justices agreed that 
agency expertise is central to the arbitrary or capricious inquiry in 
cases concerning an agency’s change of policy.268  Eskridge and Baer 
suggest that agency expertise—“the comparative institutional 
advantage of the Court vis-à-vis the relevant agencies”—explains 
some of the variation in agency win rates in different subject areas.269  
An agency’s access to relevant expertise and information, as well as 
its “capacity . . . reliably to integrate these inputs,” implicates the 
 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983). 
264 Id., quoted in Nat. Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 1275 S. Ct. 
2518, 2522 (2007). 
265 United States. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). 
266 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting Pauley v. 
BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991)); see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. 
Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376–77 (1989); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976). 
267 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
268 Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[S]hould be a strong presumption that the 
FCC's initial views, reflecting the informed judgment of independent commissioners with 
expertise in the regulated area, also reflect the views of the Congress that delegated the 
Commission authority to flesh out details not fully defined in the enacting statute.”); id. at 
1830 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“An agency's policy decisions must reflect the reasoned 
exercise of expert judgment.”). 
269 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1144. 
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accuracy of the agency’s decisions270 and thus is a relevant and 
permissible consideration for courts reviewing agency action. 
The military’s expertise is commonly invoked as a justification for 
affording the military super-deference.  Colonel Peck urged the courts 
to consider the nature of the military action at issue and the extent to 
which military expertise is involved.271  He cautioned courts to avoid 
the danger that they will not understand the ramifications of judicial 
interference, including the impact of increasing the administrative 
burden on the military.272  Professor Luban found it “self-evident that 
legislators and judges lack institutional competence to kibitz 
commanders about military matters” and posited that “[t]heir 
meddling would invite disaster.”273  Judge Wilkinson, in the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision upholding the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, said, 
“While Congress and the members of the Executive Branch have 
developed a practiced expertise by virtue of their day-to-day 
supervision of the military, the federal judiciary has not.”274  Eskridge 
and Baer do not endorse the practice of giving the military super-
deference,275 but they posit that the Justices perceive the Court as 
having “an institutional disadvantage” in national-security-related 
cases, “where interpretations are often based upon sensitive political 
calculations.”276 
Along a related line, some commentators suggest that the military 
is entitled to super-deference because it has better access to relevant 
information.  Professor Sunstein advises that courts should be 
deferential when national security is implicated because “[c]ourts lack 
information about the potentially serious consequences of their 
judgments, and the elected branches are in the best position to balance 
the competing considerations.”277  The Fourth Circuit, in upholding 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” deferred to the military in part because 
courts lack “access to intelligence and testimony on military 
readiness.”278  And Professor Vermeule proposes that “[j]udges defer 
 
270 See Chesney, supra note 3, at 1394. 
271 Peck, supra note 57, at 75. 
272 Id. 
273 Luban, supra note 227, at 478. 
274 Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 925 (4th Cir. 1996). 
275 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1185. 
276 Id. at 1144; see also id. at 1173 (“[A]gencies are usually better informed than courts 
along several dimensions . . . .”). 
277 Sunstein, supra note 94, at 270. 
278 Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 925. 
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because they think the executive has better information than they 
do.”279 
The military’s expertise, however, does not justify departing from 
the APA’s rule that all agencies are subject to the same standard of 
review under § 706.  Many agencies’ actions require expertise and 
deserve deference—deference that they should receive under the 
arbitrary or capricious standard.  Moreover, most military actions in 
wartime are insulated from judicial review under the “military 
authority” exception.280  Captain McDaniel advocates varying the 
degree of deference “proportionally with the inherently ‘military’ 
nature of the challenged discretionary action” and giving greater 
deference in cases concerning “military readiness.”281  He also 
acknowledges, though, that the “military authority” exception 
insulates many such actions from judicial review.282  In the remainder 
of cases, the executive branch may have no greater institutional 
competence than any other branch of government.283  Indeed, 
affording the military super-deference in cases that do not fall within 
the scope of the “military authority” exception may encourage the 
military to “cloak policy decisions” that do not actually require any 
special knowledge “in a shroud” of expertise.284 
Likewise, the military’s access to information should not hinder the 
courts from reviewing military action under the arbitrary or capricious 
standard.  In the administrative setting, the military likely has records 
documenting its action, and “requiring a knowledgeable affiant to 
summarize these records to an independent tribunal is a minimal 
[imposition].”285  As Professor Chesney points out, if the military 
shares its information with the court—which it is more likely to do in 
an adversarial setting—the court will be at no disadvantage “in terms 
of the quantity and quality of data available to it.”286  Just as super-
 
279 Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1135. 
280 See supra text accompanying notes 229–37. 
281 McDaniel, supra note 22, at 127. 
282 Id. at 126. 
283 Chesney, supra note 3, at 1409–11 (arguing that whether agency expertise justifies 
greater deference to agency factfinding depends on the circumstances of the case); Luban, 
supra note 227, at 542–43; Masur, supra note 3, at 509 (“many so-called ‘wartime’ cases 
may turn on issues . . . about which military administrators hold no particular expertise”). 
284 Meazell, supra note 96, at 751 (discussing the “science charade,” which “posits that 
agencies cloak policy decisions in a shroud of science, exaggerating the role of science to 
the detriment of administrative-law values, statutory goals, and science itself”). 
285 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004). 
286 Chesney, supra note 3, at 1406, 1407; see also Masur, supra note 3, at 509 (“To the 
extent that [war and national security] are impenetrable to judges, it is often because 
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deferential review may incentivize agency obfuscation, so too may 
meaningful judicial review incentivize the military to be forthcoming 
with the information underlying its decision.287 
Moreover, Congress had the opportunity to consider whether 
military expertise should play a role in judicial review under the 
APA.288  Certainly, the Congress of 1946 was well aware of the need 
to respect military judgments.289  Yet that Congress decided to 
exempt only “military authority exercised in the field in time of war” 
and to subject all other military action to the same standard of review 
as other federal agencies.  Thus, the assertion that courts should 
consider “the special requirements of military society” arising from 
the involuntary quality of military service and the need for 
discipline290 is misplaced, as such balancing is already accounted for 
in the APA.291 
Eskridge and Baer suggest that, regardless of whether the agency 
or the court has greater expertise in the subject matter, judicial 
“second-guessing” of agency decisions “produce[s] unpredictable 
results and often undermine[s] the agency’s ability to carry out the 
statutory scheme. . . .  [T]wo heads are often not as good as one when 
 
military authorities have simply refused to share relevant and necessary information.”).  
Professor Chesney also points out that an agency’s superior expertise and information 
should only warrant greater deference where “the decisionmaker actually exploits them.”  
Chesney, supra note 3, at 1411. 
287 See Meazell, supra note 96, at 751–52 (discussing incentives created by hard-look 
review of agency scientific determinations). 
288 See Kovacs, supra note 9, at 696–703 (discussing APA’s legislative history 
regarding judicial review of military action); cf. S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 61 (1941) 
(“[E]xpertness and expedition are two major justifications for the administrative 
process.”); id. at 71 (“The desire for expertness is one of the reasons for the utilization of 
the administrative process.”). 
289 See Kovacs, supra note 9, at 691–96 (discussing changes in Congress’s view of the 
military during World War II); Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1138 (“Consider that the 
drafters of the APA had just lived through a global hot war and were on the verge of a 
global cold one.”). 
290 Peck, supra note 57, at 76; see also Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 926 (4th Cir. 
1996) (“The need for deference also derives from the military’s experience with the 
particular exigencies of military life.”); McDaniel, supra note 22, at 124 (“[T]he military 
imperatives of discipline and combat readiness demand a judicial deference unlike that due 
other governmental agencies.”); cf. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690–91 (1987) 
(“In every respect the military is, as this Court has recognized, ‘a specialized society.’”) 
(quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)). 
291 Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979) (“Courts upset that balance 
when they override informed choice of procedures and impose obligations not required by 
the APA.  By the same token, courts are charged with maintaining the balance: ensuring 
that agencies comply with the ‘outline of minimum essential rights and procedures’ set out 
in the APA.”). 
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it comes to public administration.”292  Perhaps the courts are of the 
view that the military can least afford this sort of disruption.  
Professor Vermeule presumes that judges “fear the harms to national 
security that might arise if they erroneously override executive 
policies.”293  Courts may also fear that their judgments may not 
engender the same respect as decisions of the elected branches.294  
But again, Congress presumably considered these factors when it 
enacted the APA and exempted the most sensitive military actions 
from judicial review in the “military authority” exception.  Congress’s 
judgment that outside that realm the military is no more sensitive to 
regulatory disruption than other agencies should trump the courts’ 
unexpressed concerns. 
Moreover, Professor Masur demonstrates that the potential harms 
from judicial “misjudgment in [military] cases are not always 
demonstrably larger than in quotidian civilian administrative 
lawsuits.”295  He points out that the rule at issue in State Farm would 
have saved thousands of lives and thus may have carried “utilitarian 
consequences of the same order of magnitude as prototypical wartime 
adjudications.”296  Similarly, the decisions of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service under the 
Endangered Species Act carry the weight of an entire species’ 
existence.297  Judicial disruption has potentially disastrous 
consequences in that context as well, as it does in many others.  As 
Professor Masur said, “Military cases do not always hold the threat of 
substantially greater national peril, nor offer more pressing 
exigencies, nor present more intractable fact or policy questions than 
do typical administrative law adjudications.”298 
 
292 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1172. 
293 Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1135. 
294 See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 926 (“[T]he imprimatur of the President, the Congress, or 
both imparts a degree of legitimacy to military decisions that courts cannot hope to 
confer.”). 
295 Masur, supra note 3, at 503. 
296 Id. at 503–04. 
297 E.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 171 (1978) (“We begin with the premise that 
operation of the Tellico Dam will either eradicate the known population of snail darters or 
destroy their critical habitat.”); id. at 173–74 (“Accepting the Secretary's determinations, 
as we must, it is clear that TVA’s proposed operation of the dam will have precisely the 
opposite effect, namely the eradication of an endangered species.”). 
298 Masur, supra note 3, at 519. 
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C.  Procedural Distinctions 
Differences in the form of agency decisions merit different levels 
of deference under Supreme Court precedent.  The weight the Court 
affords an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers, for 
example, “depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control,” as well as the “formality” of 
the decision. 299 
The extent to which the military elicits super-deference because it 
satisfies those factors more often than other agencies is a question for 
future empirical research.  The formality of the military’s decisions is 
not likely to explain the courts’ tendency to give the military super-
deference, however, because few military decisions involve formal 
proceedings.300  The military records cases, for example, arise from 
informal adjudications.301  The Navy decision at issue in Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council302—to continue training despite 
the environmental impacts of the Navy’s activities—was no more 
formal than other agency decisions under NEPA that earned little or 
no deference.303  Eskridge and Baer found that, in cases concerning 
agency interpretations of statutes, the Supreme Court tends to prefer 
rulemakings to adjudications,304 and that agency interpretations 
presented in informal rules, guidance, manuals, and amicus briefs all 
resulted in higher-than-average win rates.305  Thus, the formality of 
the military’s decisions may provide a justification for super-
deference on a case-by-case basis, but it does not appear to warrant 
such deference across the board. 
 
299 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
300 Peck, supra note 57, at 68. 
301 See Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. United States, 603 F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Board’s rules of procedure call for informal proceedings, see 32 C.F.R. 
§ 581.3 . . . .”); Green v. White, 319 F.3d 560, 566 (3d Cir. 2003). 
302 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
303 E.g., Native Ecosystems Council v. Tidwell, 599 F.3d 926, 937 (9th Cir. 2010); S. 
Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 
725–28 (9th Cir. 2009); New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 
F.3d 683, 706–15 (10th Cir. 2009). 
304 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1147 (finding “markedly higher win rates for 
agency interpretations embodied in rulemaking as opposed to adjudications”). 
305 Id. at 1148. 
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Consistency, on the other hand, may weigh in the military’s favor.  
Eskridge and Baer found that the consistency of an agency’s 
interpretation over time played “a significant role in predicting 
agency success.”306  Courts may be less inclined to defer to agencies 
they perceive as biased.307  Perhaps the military is perceived as more 
consistent and less politically variable than other agencies and gets 
more deference because of that.  Again, whether that factor explains 
the broad application of super-deference in military cases is fodder for 
empirical study.  As discussed below, however,308 courts applying a 
higher level of deference to the military than to other agencies should 
explain their departure from Congress’s judgment that all agencies are 
entitled to the same level of deference under the arbitrary or 
capricious standard. 
Another possible explanation for the courts’ practice of giving the 
military super-deference in APA cases is the judicial tendency to 
“reward[] agencies when they provide useful information about the 
history of the statutory scheme, real-world facts and context, and the 
consequences of different interpretations for the effectuation of 
complicated congressional purposes.”309  Eskridge and Baer refer to 
this as “consultative deference.”310  In cases in which the Supreme 
Court employed consultative deference, which Eskridge and Baer 
found was “by far the most frequent deference regime actually 
followed by the Court,”311 the agency won 80.6% of the time,312 well 
above the average of 68.8%.313  Even if one could show that the 
military tends to provide more of this sort of useful information in its 
briefs than other agencies, however, that would not justify the broad 
application of super-deference in all military cases.  Indeed, because 
this factor has nothing to do with the quality of the agency’s decision, 
 
306 Id; see also id. at 1149 (“[T]he Court has a [strong] preference for supporting 
interpretations that are stable . . . .”); Eskridge, supra note 126, at 1481–83.  The presence 
or absence of a clear delegation of rulemaking authority from Congress was not a good 
predictor of agency win rates.  Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1129. 
307 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1173. 
308 See infra text accompanying notes 357–81. 
309 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1143–44; see also id. at 1114 (positing that the 
Court relies “on agency inputs in its reasoning and decisionmaking” because agencies 
provide “useful information” like legislative or regulatory history, relevant data and facts, 
or “experience-based analysis”). 
310 Id. at 1113; see also id. at 1111 (under consultative deference, “the Court relies on 
some input from the agency . . . to shape its reasoning and influence its decision”). 
311 Id. at 1113. 
312 Id. at 1142 tbl.15. 
313 Id. at 1127, 1129 tbl.7. 
KOVACS 1/31/2012  1:40 PM 
2011] Leveling the Deference Playing Field 631 
but only its representation in court, it is not a permissible common-
law interpretation of the arbitrary or capricious standard.314 
D.  Ideology 
A final factor that probably explains, but does not justify, the 
courts’ tendency to give the military super-deference in APA cases is 
ideology.  Eskridge and Baer concluded that “the ideological 
characterization of the agency interpretation” is the strongest indicator 
of agency success.315  Other studies have confirmed that ideology 
plays a significant role in judicial review of agency decisions.316  
Professors Miles and Sunstein demonstrated that Democratic 
appointees vote to validate certain agency decisions significantly 
more often than Republican appointees317 and are “far more likely to 
uphold liberal decisions than conservative ones.”318  Republican 
appointees “show the opposite pattern.”319  Eskridge and Baer agree 
that, “across the board, the ideology of the agency interpretation 
matters to Justices—and the way it matters depends on the political 
inclinations of the Justice.”320  Indeed, this phenomenon may be more 
pronounced in cases implicating national security than other areas of 
the law.321  Significantly, the standard of review does not appear to 
 
314 Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (“The grounds upon which an 
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its 
action was based.”). 
315 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1156. 
316 Canon & Giles, supra note 88, at 190 (the Supreme Court’s “willingness to support 
an agency . . . stems largely from the justices’ attitudes towards the agency’s substantive 
policies”); Crowley, supra note 88, at 276 (finding “rather striking support for the 
hypothesis that agency support is a function of the policy direction of that agency”); 
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?  An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825–26 (2006) (“[T]he data reveal a 
strong relationship between the judges’ ideological predisposition and the probability that 
they will validate agency determinations.”); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) 
(“[I]deology significantly influences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit.”); 
Sheehan, supra note 88, at 884 (“[T]he policy position of the agency is an important 
factor.”). 
317 Miles & Sunstein, supra note 88, at 767. 
318 Id. at 784; see also Sunstein, supra note 94, at 272. 
319 Miles & Sunstein, supra note 88, at 784. 
320 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1155. 
321 See Sunstein, supra note 94, at 279 (finding that the difference in voting behavior 
between majority Democrat and majority Republican panels is more pronounced in 
national security cases than “in any other area of federal law”). 
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dampen the effect of ideology.322  Miles and Sunstein observed that, 
whether courts reviewed actions of the Environmental Protection 
Agency or National Labor Relations Board under Chevron or under 
the arbitrary or capricious standard, ideology had a similar effect.323  
They concluded that “judicial policy judgments play an 
unquestionable role under arbitrariness review.”324 
Typically, the makeup of the appellate panel significantly impacts 
voting behavior.325  Democratic appointees tend to vote more 
liberally as the number of Democratic appointees on the panel 
increases, and Republican appointees do the same.326  Conversely, 
judges tend to moderate their voting when they are in the minority on 
a three-judge panel.327  In some areas, however, such as abortion and 
capital punishment, panel composition does not impact voting 
behavior.328  Professor Sunstein found a similar absence of panel 
impacts in national security cases, presumably because judges’ 
“convictions are deeply held.”329  Eskridge and Baer similarly 
suggested that the “intensity of (judicial) preferences” might explain 
differential win rates.330 
The empirical evidence suggests, then, that the courts’ practice of 
giving super-deference to the military may simply reflect judicial 
ideological preferences.331  Professor Steven Lichtman concluded that 
 
322 Miles & Sunstein, supra note 88, at 768 (“[I]deology influences judges’ 
decisionmaking to the same extent regardless of the judicial task or the standard of 
review.”). 
323 Id. (“[T]he role of political judgments appears to be strikingly similar when courts 
are reviewing agency interpretations of law under Chevron U.S.A. Inc v NRDC and when 
judges are addressing questions of fact and policy under arbitrariness review.”). 
324 Id. at 780; see also id. at 784 (“Arbitrariness review is being applied in a way that 
shows a large influence from judicial policy preferences.”). 
325 Id. at 784. 
326 Id. at 785; see also Revesz, supra note 316 at 1764 (“[T]he ideology of one’s 
colleagues is a better predictor of one’s vote than one’s own ideology.”); Sunstein, supra 
note 94, at 273. 
327 Sunstein, supra note 94, at 273. 
328 Id. at 274–75. 
329 Id. at 279–80, 290. 
330 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1146.  Eskridge and Baer found that, where the 
Justices have strongly held views about the subject matter, they are more likely to overturn 
the agency.  Id. at 1146–47; see also Eskridge, supra note 126, at 1480–81. 
331 The decision in Winter, for example, may have reflected the extent to which the 
Justices value marine life.  See Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme 
Court: A Cultural Analysis, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363 (2006); Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty 
Years of Environmental Protection Law in the Supreme Court, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 
(1999); Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in 
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“the military’s success rate is an instance in which there is an 
‘ideology’ backstopping the success of this particular repeat 
player.”332  Obviously, that is not a permissible common-law exegesis 
of the arbitrary or capricious standard.333 
Commentators agree that, normatively, it would be desirable to 
reduce the impact of ideology in administrative judicial review,334 but 
how that should be accomplished is the subject of academic debate.335  
Some commentators advocate formalist rules.336  Eskridge and Baer 
point out, however, that even the most ardent textualist judges vote 
along ideological lines and that textualist approaches “are too thin to 
overwhelm judicial preconceptions.”337  Other commentators 
advocate turning to legislative history.338  Eskridge and Baer agree 
that legislative history “offers a greater chance of supplanting the 
judge’s own preconceptions,”339 but they show that Justices who rely 
on legislative history also vote ideologically.340  Professor Sunstein 
advocates the use of non-delegation canons.341  Eskridge and Baer 
counter that canonical approaches are no more effective at 
overcoming judicial ideology than textualist approaches: Justices 
 
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703 (2000); Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law 
and the Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653 (2002). 
332 Lichtman, supra note 94, at 945.  Lichtman also points out that 35 out of 110 
Supreme Court Justices included in his analysis served in the military.  Id. at 949. 
333 Similarly, a super-deference rule premised sub silentio on the desire “to shield the 
judiciary from . . . institutional harms in the form of lost prestige, legitimacy, or political 
capital,” Chesney, supra note 3, at 1397, would not be within the scope of the arbitrary or 
capricious standard.  See also id. at 1429 (“We cannot expect judges to attribute deference 
decisions to this motivation, of course, but we must account for the possibility—even the 
likelihood—that such concerns will play some role.”). 
334 E.g., Miles & Sunstein, supra note 88, at 802; id. at 814 (arguing that judicial review 
of agency action should not provide “a method of substituting judicial policy preferences 
for agency policy preferences”); see also Miles & Sunstein, supra note 316, at 827 (“[T]he 
meaning of federal statutory law should not be based on whether a litigant has drawn a 
panel of judges appointed by a president from a particular party . . . .”). 
335 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1193–95 (describing various academic 
proposals).  Professor Chesney simply proceeds on the assumption that some judges 
decide cases based on the law and prudential factors, rather than their own ideological and 
value preferences.  Chesney, supra note 3, at 1402. 
336 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1193–95. 
337 Id. at 1195. 
338 Id. 
339 Id. 
340 Id. at 1194. 
341 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 
115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2607–10 (2006). 
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employ such canons to reach ideologically driven results as well.342  
Ultimately, Eskridge and Baer suggest simply that the Supreme Court 
should “clearly announce” its deference rule based on several factors 
that Eskridge and Baer advocate “and then stick to it.”343  As detailed 
below, I agree that the courts should explain their reasoning clearly 
and stick to the balance Congress struck in the APA. 
V 
IMPLICATIONS 
Because there is no justification for broad application of a super-
deference standard of review in military cases under the APA, the 
courts should cease this practice.  Commentators have long called on 
the courts to halt the creation of unauthorized common law.344  
Professor Duffy focused his plea on administrative common law that 
exceeds the bounds of the APA and urged the courts to “require of 
themselves the same authorization in law to support their own 
creations, and the same respect for statutory law, that they require of 
executive agencies in defending their programs.”345  The Supreme 
Court has already acknowledged that the APA supplants judicial 
common law, at least in part.346  The courts should now acknowledge 
that judicially crafted standards of review that have no grounding in 
the APA may exceed the courts’ authority.  The Supreme Court 
recognized shortly after the enactment of the APA that, in the Act, 
“Congress expressed a mood.  And it expressed its mood not merely 
by oratory but by legislation.  As legislation that mood must be 
respected. . . .”347 
The recognition that Congress can and does add military 
exemptions to substantive statutes should alleviate any lingering 
concerns about the potential for judicial review of administrative 
military action to interrupt military priorities.  In 2002, the District 
Court for the District of Columbia enjoined Navy training on the 
island of Farallon de Medinilla348 based on the Navy’s violation of 
 
342 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 8, at 1195. 
343 Id. at 1196. 
344 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 109. 
345 Duffy, supra note 6, at 213. 
346 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009). 
347 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951). 
348 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 
201 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122 (D.D.C. 2002) (enjoining military training). 
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the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA),349 which is enforceable only 
through the APA.350  Although the “military authority” exception 
already precluded APA review of the Navy’s training, Congress 
responded by exempting certain “military readiness activities” from 
the MBTA.351  Again, in 2003, Congress responded to a district court 
injunction352 by exempting “military readiness activities” from 
certain provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act,353 the 
relevant provisions of which are actionable only through the APA.354  
These statutes spurred debate,355 but regardless of whether they were 
necessary or not, they demonstrate that Congress can protect the 
military from judicial overreaching. 
Judicial candor may provide a mechanism for bringing an end to 
the practice of giving the military more deference than it is due under 
the APA.  Commentators have long extolled the benefits of judicial 
candor.356  In his seminal essay on the topic, Professor Shapiro 
argued that “candor is the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse 
of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, 
statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe 
one thing about them and to say another.”357  Professor Shapiro 
 
349 The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006), provides in part: 
“Unless and except as permitted by regulations . . . it shall be unlawful . . . to pursue, hunt, 
take, capture, kill . . . any migratory bird” covered by bilateral international agreements 
with Canada, Mexico, Japan, and the former Soviet Union, entered into for the protection 
of migratory birds.  16 U.S.C. § 703(a). 
350 Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
351 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 
107-314, 116 Stat. 2509, § 315(a) (2002), provided that the MBTA’s prohibition against 
taking migratory birds “shall not apply to the incidental taking of a migratory bird by a 
member of the Armed Forces during a military readiness activity authorized by the 
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned.” 
352 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
353 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, 117 
Stat. 1392, § 319(c) (2003). 
354 See Didrickson v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 982 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1992). 
355 Compare Hope Babcock, National Security and Environmental Laws: A Clear and 
Present Danger?, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 105 (2007), with E.G. Willard et al., Environmental 
Law and National Security: Can Existing Exemptions In Environmental Laws Preserve 
DOD Training and Operational Prerogatives Without New Legislation?, 54 A.F. L. REV. 
65 (2004). 
356 See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 214, at 365–71, 383 (urging courts to be 
more candid regarding methods of statutory interpretation); Micah Schwartzman, Judicial 
Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 988 n.2 (2008) (Indeed, “[s]ystematic criticism of judicial 
candor is a fairly recent phenomenon.”). 
357 David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 
(1987); see also id. at 750 (“[C]andor is to the judicial process what notice is to fair 
procedure.”). 
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posited that the nature of the judicial process mandates that judges 
provide reasons for their decisions “that can be debated, attacked, and 
defended.”358  That argument is particularly salient in the context of 
judicial review of administrative action.  When courts take on the task 
of cabining agencies within the bounds of their statutory authority, 
they should be equally forthcoming about the limits of their own 
authority.359 
Professor Merrill advocates judicial transparency as a means to 
“promote rigor and clarity in judicial thinking about the appropriate 
role of federal common law.”360  He believes that candor yields 
“predictability and stability,”361 which are goals of the APA and 
values of the rule of law.362  Predictability in the law “appeals to 
basic notions of fairness” by giving notice to potential litigants of 
what the law requires.363  By the same token, giving agencies notice 
of what to expect from judicial review may prevent arbitrary agency 
action.364  It cannot be gainsaid that the military requires 
predictability to fulfill its mission of protecting the nation.365  To the 
extent that being forthright about the standard of review applicable to 
administrative military action under the APA would enable the 
military to anticipate the outcome of legal challenges and thus 
enhance military readiness, it is certainly something to be desired. 
 
358 Id. at 737.  But see Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1335–50 (1995) (critiquing the notion that candor is required to make 
the judiciary accountable and keep it within the bounds of its authority). 
359 See supra text accompanying notes 180–81; cf. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor 
and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 402 (1989) (“A court that lays claim to the 
power to pronounce legal rights and remedies cannot expect obedience if its process is 
corrupted by lying.”).  But see id. at 404–05 (arguing that candor may threaten judicial 
integrity). 
360 Merrill, supra note 109, at 72; see also Idleman, supra note 358, at 1350 (“[C]andor 
[may] serve to increase the soundness of the judiciary’s decisionmaking and in turn the 
quality—e.g., the coherence, the clarity, and even the choice of reasons—of its written 
opinions.”). 
361 Merrill, supra note 109, at 72; see also Stack, supra note 175, at 568. 
362 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1826 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he [APA] . . . and the rule of law . . . favor stability over administrative 
whim.”). 
363 Zeppos, supra note 359, at 401.  But see id. at 402–03 (arguing that judicial candor 
does not yield greater predictability). 
364 Cf. Manning, supra note 17, at 674 (“[T]ransparent [agency] rules have a salutary 
effect on the control of arbitrariness.”); Stack, supra note 175, at 568 (“[U]ncertainty does 
nothing to limit adventurous assertions of statutory power by presidents.”). 
365 Peck, supra note 57, at 80 (“[T]he increased degree of predictability would itself 
have a salutary effect on the entire subject area [reviewability of challenges to military 
administrative activities].”). 
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Professor Metzger endorses transparency in acknowledging the 
role of constitutional common law in administrative law because it is 
difficult to hold agencies accountable for their decisions if “judicial 
obfuscation” masks the standard of review.366  She posits that a “lack 
of transparency is a serious impediment to both judicial and 
administrative accountability.”367  Without some acknowledgment of 
and explanation for giving the military super-deference, there is no 
means for testing the courts’ application of or the military’s pleas for 
that standard.368 
Judicial candor may have other salutary effects in this context as 
well.  It may prevent the “spillover effects” of excessively lenient 
judicial review of administrative military actions in other areas of the 
law.369  By explicating the circumstances in which super-deference is 
warranted, courts may minimize the chances that national security 
concerns will impact the analysis of otherwise routine administrative 
issues.  Moreover, judicial transparency enables both the public and 
Congress to understand and respond to judicial decisions through the 
democratic process.370  Finally, to the extent that judicial ideology 
provides the motivation for deferring excessively to the military in 
APA cases, judicial candor may counteract that tendency to some 
extent.371 
 
366 Metzger, supra note 6, at 486; see also id. at 506, 534–37. 
367 Id. at 535. 
368 Cf. Masur, supra note 3, at 506 (“[T]here exists no internal mechanism to prevent 
executive branch actors from simply alleging generalized threats to national security at the 
outset of any wartime adjudication.”). 
369 See Huq, supra note 97, at 271 (“Spillover effects that result from the convergence 
of national security with general public law, such as in Iqbal, may create an incrementalist 
avenue to across-the-board abrogation of the federal courts’ liberty-protecting function.”); 
see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (“The Federal Circuit’s [clearly 
erroneous] standard would require us to create . . . precedent that itself could prove 
disruptive by too readily permitting other agencies to depart from uniform APA 
requirements.”). 
370 See Kagan, supra note 223, at 2331–33; Stack, supra note 175, at 568 (“[W]ithout a 
general framework, Congress has no baseline around which to legislate and specifically to 
indicate when it seeks to grant broad deference to the president and when it does not.”). 
371 See David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 514 (2001) (Advocating a rule of judicial ethics that would 
require candor in judicial opinions: “An ethical judge must demand of herself that she 
identify and understand her own biases and how they affect her reaction to a case.”); 
Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and The Canon of Acceptable 
Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 138–42 (1998) (urging courts to be candid about the role of 
“naked politics” in federal courts jurisprudence).  Of course, this notion is not without 
controversy.  See Zeppos, supra note 359, at 406–12 (arguing that calls for judicial candor 
may be unrealistic because judges may not be aware of the real reasons for their 
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Judicial candor may not always be “desirable,”372 however, much 
less required.373  It “may reveal unpalatable value choices, raise 
obstacles to securing the agreement of multimember bodies, or have 
worrying implications for future decisions.”374  It may be ineffective 
if the court’s audience is unable or unwilling to respond to the court’s 
transparency,375 and it may even threaten the judiciary’s institutional 
legitimacy.376  None of those concerns, however, diminish the value 
of courts acknowledging the extent to which they depart from the 
APA’s standard of review in military cases.377 
The first step, then, is for courts to state explicitly when they apply 
a standard of review to the military under the APA that exceeds the 
already deferential arbitrary or capricious standard.  In 
acknowledging that they are applying a standard of review that has no 
foundation in statutory text, the courts may think more carefully about 
why they are doing it and limit that common-law standard to the few 
cases in which it is truly justified. 
Professor Vermeule might object that my aim here is “hopelessly 
utopian.”378  He contends that black holes—like the “military 
authority” exception—and grey holes—like the tendency to give the 
 
decisions).  Compare Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990) 
(arguing that too much judicial introspection about the extent to which the law actually 
constrains the courts could reduce judicial candor), with Gail Heriot, Way Beyond Candor, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 1945 (1991) (critiquing Altman’s thesis and arguing that courts should 
adhere to the moral precept to seek the truth). 
372 Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1132. 
373 See Idleman, supra note 358, at 1310 (arguing that federal appellate judges “may 
regularly forgo candor under the principles of logic and prudence and still retain their 
political legitimacy and institutional integrity”). 
374 Metzger, supra note 6, at 535; see also Idleman, supra note 358, at 1384, 1386 
(avoiding candor may be justified “by the need to reach a consensus among factions within 
any given case” or “to mask a fundamental value conflict”); Shapiro, supra note 357, at 
739–50 (refuting arguments that judicial candor is not always preferable). 
375 Idleman, supra note 358, at 1383–84. 
376 Id. at 1388–94. 
377 Professor Vermeule posits that “hypocritical lip-service to the rule of law” may be 
best “in the long run” because acknowledging the black holes in administrative law 
explicitly may undermine rule-of-law values.  Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1132; see also 
id. at 1136.  He argues that it is preferable to “preserve the façade of law so that one day, 
when the crisis has passed, a real building may be constructed behind it.”  Id. at 1132–33.  
But super-deference to the military is not limited to times of national emergency.  Rather, 
there is an express black hole, the “military authority” exception, which insulates the 
military from judicial review at such times.  In the case of judicial review of administrative 
military action under the APA, it is hard to see how judicial honesty about the standard of 
review would be unwelcome. 
378 Id. at 1097. 
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military super-deference—are inevitable.379  Here, however, I seek 
merely to substitute one judicially created grey hole—super-deference 
to the military—for another congressionally established grey hole—
the arbitrary or capricious standard, which applies alike to all federal 
agencies.  I do not quibble with Professor Vermeule’s assertion that 
the intensity of review under the arbitrary or capricious standard can 
be adjusted to the circumstances.380  I merely assert that the standard 
should be adjusted alike for all agencies, as Congress in 1946—a 
Congress that was well aware of the need for strong executive action 
during times of national emergency—intended. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress subjected the military to the same standard of review 
under the APA as other federal agencies: the deferential arbitrary or 
capricious standard.  The courts, however, have continued to give the 
military more deference than most other agencies.  Like all 
unauthorized federal common law, that practice raises separation-of-
powers concerns.  The failure of the unelected judiciary to adhere to 
the political bargain embodied in the APA is particularly problematic, 
given the unusual history of the APA and the stature it has attained 
over time.  The practice of giving the military heightened deference 
under the APA also brings into focus the hypocrisy of courts limiting 
agency discretion through rules that exceed judicial authority, and it 
implicates the rule-of-law values associated with applying 
consistently rules to restrain government discretion.  It also 
undermines two of the APA’s primary purposes: to increase 
uniformity in administrative law and to augment judicial review of 
agency action.  Additionally, it runs against the current of the 
Supreme Court’s increasing adherence to the text of the APA. 
Departing from the text of the APA is not necessarily 
impermissible, but there is no justification for the broad application of 
a super-deference standard of review to military action under the 
APA.  The Commander in Chief is not amenable to suit under the 
APA, and even if the Commander in Chief power extends to 
executive branch officers, the exception for “military authority 
exercised in the field in time of war” insulates core military activities 
from judicial review.  In peacetime, Congress generally has 
paramount authority over the military and may authorize judicial 
 
379 Id. 
380 Id. at 1134. 
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review of military action without raising constitutional concerns.  A 
sliver of cases implicating Presidential powers may remain subject to 
judicial review under the APA in peacetime, but the deferential 
arbitrary or capricious standard belies the need for an even more 
deferential standard of review.  The military’s expertise entitles it to 
no greater respect than many other agencies.  The empirical evidence 
indicates that judicial ideology may be a driving force behind the 
tendency to give the military super-deference.  If so, that certainly 
does not justify departing from the plain command of the statute. 
Judicial candor may provide a means of counteracting the tendency 
to give the military excessive deference.  Acknowledging explicitly 
when courts apply a standard of review that is more deferential than 
the arbitrary or capricious standard might make both courts and 
agencies more accountable, promote stability and predictability in the 
law, and counteract ideological tendencies.  It would also leave 
Congress free to provide the military more protection from the 
judiciary if necessary. 
The APA is not a complete codification of administrative law.  
Such an enormous undertaking would be beyond the scope of such a 
short piece of legislation, and perhaps beyond Congress’s capacity.381  
Congress left numerous holes that have required judicial filling.  
Thus, the question of whether administrative common law survived 
the passage of the APA is not an either/or proposition.  For example, 
the APA did not prohibit the federal courts from employing equitable 
doctrines to fashion appropriate remedies.382  But some areas of the 
 
381 See H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, H.R. Rep. 
No. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40, at 250 (“The bill 
is an outline of minimum essential rights and procedures.”); Vermeule, supra note 16, at 
1108 (“[T]he administrative state is too varied and complex to be regulated by crisp legal 
standards formulated in advance . . . .”).  But see S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
ADMINSTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. Rep. No. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 40, at 191 (Senate Judiciary Committee aimed “to make sure that the 
bill [was] complete enough to cover the whole field.”). 
382 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“Nothing herein . . . affects . . . the power or duty of the 
court to . . . deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground . . . .”); Levin, 
supra note 6; see also Duffy, supra note 6, at 128 (the Judiciary Act of 1875 “should be 
viewed as an authorization for the federal courts to administer a federal common law of 
equitable remedies without further statutory authorization”).  Professor Huq focused his 
analysis of whether national security cases are unique on the remedy because it provides 
“a more fine-grained tool for assessing the consequences of judicial action than 
dichotomous metrics such as win/loss rates or tendencies to deference.”  Huq, supra note 
97, at 229.  Perhaps the Supreme Court was willing to defer so broadly in Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council because the APA expressly preserves the courts’ 
equitable discretion to fashion a remedy appropriate to the case. 
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law are completely codified.  Where Congress provides clear 
direction for agencies and courts to follow, agencies and courts 
should follow.  The courts should cease reliance on common-law 
doctrines that do not comport with Congress’s stated intent absent a 
sufficient reason to do so, and they certainly should not rely on those 
doctrines without even acknowledging that they are doing so.  All 
agencies of the federal government are entitled to deference under the 
arbitrary or capricious standard, not just the military, and not based on 
unexamined assumptions.  The practice of giving different agencies 
different levels of deference is contrary to Congress’s considered 
judgment and should come to an end. 
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